I agree that there is a massive difference between actions/strategies that are net-negative, neutral, and net-positive; in other words, I do agree that it is really important to figure out whether an action or strategy actually contributes to solving a problem at all, and whether it may cause unintended negative effects.
I think the possibility of quite harmful outcomes will tend to be associated with that of quite beneficial outcomes, so the tails will partially cancel out, which contributes towards mitigating impact differentials. Relatedly, you may want to check Counterproductive Altruism: The Other Heavy Tail. Here is the abstract:
First, we argue that the appeal of effective altruism (henceforth, EA) depends significantly on a certain empirical premise we call the Heavy Tail Hypothesis (HTH), which characterizes the probability distribution of opportunities for doing good. Roughly, the HTH implies that the best causes, interventions, or charities produce orders of magnitude greater good than the average ones, constituting a substantial portion of the total amount of good caused by altruistic interventions. Next, we canvass arguments EAs have given for the existence of a positive (or “right”) heavy tail and argue that they can also apply in support of a negative (or “left”) heavy tail where counterproductive interventions do orders of magnitude more harm than ineffective or moderately harmful ones. Incorporating the other heavy tail of the distribution has important implications for the core activities of EA: effectiveness research, cause prioritization, and the assessment of altruistic interventions. It also informs the debate surrounding the institutional critique of EA.
Thanks for the comment! Just to make sure I understand correctly: the tails would partially cancel out in expected impact estimates because many actions with potentially high positive impact could also have potentially high negative impact if any of our assumptions are wrong? Or were you gesturing at something else? (Please feel free to simply point me to the post you shared if the answer is continued therein; I haven’t had the chance to read it carefully yet)
the tails would partially cancel out in expected impact estimates because many actions with potentially high positive impact could also have potentially high negative impact if any of our assumptions are wrong?
Yes. For example, cost-effectiveness analyses of global health and development interventions assume that saving lives is good, but this may not be so due to effects on animals. A lower cost to save a life will be associated not only with generating more nearterm human welfare per $ (right tail; good), but also with generating more nearterm animal suffering per $ (left tail; bad), since the people who were saved would likely consume factory-farmed animals (see meat eater problem).
Great post, Sarah! I strongly upvoted it.
I think the possibility of quite harmful outcomes will tend to be associated with that of quite beneficial outcomes, so the tails will partially cancel out, which contributes towards mitigating impact differentials. Relatedly, you may want to check Counterproductive Altruism: The Other Heavy Tail. Here is the abstract:
Thanks for the comment! Just to make sure I understand correctly: the tails would partially cancel out in expected impact estimates because many actions with potentially high positive impact could also have potentially high negative impact if any of our assumptions are wrong? Or were you gesturing at something else? (Please feel free to simply point me to the post you shared if the answer is continued therein; I haven’t had the chance to read it carefully yet)
Yes. For example, cost-effectiveness analyses of global health and development interventions assume that saving lives is good, but this may not be so due to effects on animals. A lower cost to save a life will be associated not only with generating more nearterm human welfare per $ (right tail; good), but also with generating more nearterm animal suffering per $ (left tail; bad), since the people who were saved would likely consume factory-farmed animals (see meat eater problem).