Since you define worldview as a “set of … beliefs that favor a certain kind of giving,” then it matters whether you understand income and health as “intrinsically [or] instrumentally valuable.” In the latter but not the former case, if you learn that income and health do not optimize for your desired end, you would change your giving.
I am understanding investment recommendation implications as programs on education, relationship improvement, cooperation (with achievement outcomes), mental health, chronic pain reduction, happiness vs. life satisfaction research, conflict prevention and mitigation, companionship, employment, crime reduction, and democracy:
and the objective list, where wellbeing consists in various objective goods such as knowledge, love, and achievement
underweight invisible, ongoing misery (such as mental illness or chronic pain)
the best thing for improving happiness may be different from the best thing for increasing life satisfaction. Investigating this requires extra work.
other things affect our wellbeing too (such as war, loneliness, unemployment, crime, living in a democracy, etc.) and their value is not entirely reducible to effects on health or income.
Divestment recommendations can be understood as bednets in Kenya, GiveDirectly transfers to some but not other members of large proportion extremely poor communities, and Centre for Pesticide Suicide Prevention:
It’s worth pointing out that many of those whose lives are saved by the interventions that OP funds, such as anti-malaria bednets, will have a life satisfaction score below the neutral point, unless we set it at, or near to, 0⁄10. IDinsight’s aforementioned beneficiary preferences survey has an SWB question and found those surveyed in Kenya had an average life satisfaction score of 2.3/10.
But OP (and others) tend to ignore fairness; the aim is just to do the most good.
But, don’t happier people gain a greater benefit from an extra year of life than less happy people? If so, how can it be consistent to conclude we should account for quantity when assessing the value of saving lives, but not quality?
I understand that you disengage from replies but I am interested in OP’s perspective on the 0-10 life satisfaction value at which you would invest into life satisfaction improving rather than family planning programs.
I am also wondering about your definition of health and rationale for selecting the DALY metric to represent this state.
Since you define worldview as a “set of … beliefs that favor a certain kind of giving,” then it matters whether you understand income and health as “intrinsically [or] instrumentally valuable.” In the latter but not the former case, if you learn that income and health do not optimize for your desired end, you would change your giving.
I am understanding investment recommendation implications as programs on education, relationship improvement, cooperation (with achievement outcomes), mental health, chronic pain reduction, happiness vs. life satisfaction research, conflict prevention and mitigation, companionship, employment, crime reduction, and democracy:
Divestment recommendations can be understood as bednets in Kenya, GiveDirectly transfers to some but not other members of large proportion extremely poor communities, and Centre for Pesticide Suicide Prevention:
I understand that you disengage from replies but I am interested in OP’s perspective on the 0-10 life satisfaction value at which you would invest into life satisfaction improving rather than family planning programs.
I am also wondering about your definition of health and rationale for selecting the DALY metric to represent this state.