Utility = well-being = whatâs worth caring about for an individualâs sake. Itâs an open normative question what this is. So you should feel totally free, conceptually, to include more than just hedonic states in your account of utility, if thatâs what you find all-things-considered most plausible! Hedonism is not a âdefinitionâ of utility, but just one candidate account (or theory) of what constitutes it.
It can be a tricky taxonomic question whether putative objective values (like âexcellenceâ) are best understood as components of well-being, or as non-welfare values. One test is to ask: is it specifically for your childâs sake that you prefer that they have the grander-but-slightly-less-happy life? Or is it just that you think this makes for an impersonally better world (potentially worth a very mild cost to your child)? The former option suggests that you see grandeur as a component of well-being; the latter would instead be a non-welfare value.
On the broader methodological question of when we should revise our theory of value vs rejecting the consequentialist idea that promoting value is foundational to ethics, see my old blog post: âAnti-Consequentialism and Axiological Refinementsâ. The key idea:
So when faced with [objections to classical utilitarianism], itâs worth asking not just whether the action seems wrong, but whether the outcome is really desirable in the first place. If not, the consequentialist has a simple response: the act is indeed wrong, precisely because it doesnât maximize whatâs (genuinely) good.
Thank you for such a thoughtful response! This helps clear up some confusion and gives me more to think about. The perks of accessible discourse with an academic philosopher ;)
Glad you liked the post!
Utility = well-being = whatâs worth caring about for an individualâs sake. Itâs an open normative question what this is. So you should feel totally free, conceptually, to include more than just hedonic states in your account of utility, if thatâs what you find all-things-considered most plausible! Hedonism is not a âdefinitionâ of utility, but just one candidate account (or theory) of what constitutes it.
See our chapter on âTheories of Well-Beingâ at utilitarianism.net for more detail.
It can be a tricky taxonomic question whether putative objective values (like âexcellenceâ) are best understood as components of well-being, or as non-welfare values. One test is to ask: is it specifically for your childâs sake that you prefer that they have the grander-but-slightly-less-happy life? Or is it just that you think this makes for an impersonally better world (potentially worth a very mild cost to your child)? The former option suggests that you see grandeur as a component of well-being; the latter would instead be a non-welfare value.
On the broader methodological question of when we should revise our theory of value vs rejecting the consequentialist idea that promoting value is foundational to ethics, see my old blog post: âAnti-Consequentialism and Axiological Refinementsâ. The key idea:
Thank you for such a thoughtful response! This helps clear up some confusion and gives me more to think about. The perks of accessible discourse with an academic philosopher ;)