I was originally going to write an essay based on this prompt but I don’t think I actually understand the Epicurean view well enough to do it justice. So instead, here’s a quick list of what seem to me to be the implications. I don’t exactly agree with the Epicurean view but I do tend to believe that death in itself isn’t bad, it’s only bad in that it prevents you from having future good experiences.
Metrics like “$3000 per life saved” don’t really make sense.
I avoid referencing dollars-per-life-saved when I’m being rigorous. I might use them when speaking casually—it’s an easy way to introduce EA or GiveWell to new people.
Interventions that focus on preventing deaths are not good purely because they prevent deaths. Preventing a person’s death is good if that person then gets to experience a good life, and the goodness of preventing the death exactly equals the goodness of the life (minus the goodness of any life that would have existed otherwise).
This is most obviously relevant for life-saving global poverty charities such as the Against Malaria Foundation (AMF). Some people (including Michael Plant and me) have criticized GiveWell’s recommendation of AMF on this basis—my post doesn’t explicitly discuss the Epicurean view, but Michael Plant’s post does (under “4. Epicureanism”).
One’s view of death isn’t relevant to most of the popular EA charities:
Many popular global poverty charities, like GiveDirectly, don’t prevent deaths (much). Any reasonable philosophical view should agree that improving people’s welfare is good, all else equal.
Factory farming interventions such as cage-free campaigns improve animals’ welfare but don’t affect death.
Vegetarian/vegan advocacy causes animals not to exist (by reducing demand for meat). This neither causes nor prevents deaths so it’s also not affected by the Epicurean view.
People who prioritize preventing existential risk rarely do so because it cost-effectively prevents deaths. Instead, they want to preserve the value of the long-run future, which again applies equally well whether you adopt the Epicurean view or not.
One could argue that existential risk is indeed cost-effective at preventing deaths, as Carl Shulman does here. In that case, your view of the badness of death becomes relevant. But I think Carl Shulman’s argument still works even under the Epicurean view.
I was originally going to write an essay based on this prompt but I don’t think I actually understand the Epicurean view well enough to do it justice. So instead, here’s a quick list of what seem to me to be the implications. I don’t exactly agree with the Epicurean view but I do tend to believe that death in itself isn’t bad, it’s only bad in that it prevents you from having future good experiences.
Metrics like “$3000 per life saved” don’t really make sense.
I avoid referencing dollars-per-life-saved when I’m being rigorous. I might use them when speaking casually—it’s an easy way to introduce EA or GiveWell to new people.
Interventions that focus on preventing deaths are not good purely because they prevent deaths. Preventing a person’s death is good if that person then gets to experience a good life, and the goodness of preventing the death exactly equals the goodness of the life (minus the goodness of any life that would have existed otherwise).
This is most obviously relevant for life-saving global poverty charities such as the Against Malaria Foundation (AMF). Some people (including Michael Plant and me) have criticized GiveWell’s recommendation of AMF on this basis—my post doesn’t explicitly discuss the Epicurean view, but Michael Plant’s post does (under “4. Epicureanism”).
One’s view of death isn’t relevant to most of the popular EA charities:
Many popular global poverty charities, like GiveDirectly, don’t prevent deaths (much). Any reasonable philosophical view should agree that improving people’s welfare is good, all else equal.
Factory farming interventions such as cage-free campaigns improve animals’ welfare but don’t affect death.
Vegetarian/vegan advocacy causes animals not to exist (by reducing demand for meat). This neither causes nor prevents deaths so it’s also not affected by the Epicurean view.
People who prioritize preventing existential risk rarely do so because it cost-effectively prevents deaths. Instead, they want to preserve the value of the long-run future, which again applies equally well whether you adopt the Epicurean view or not.
One could argue that existential risk is indeed cost-effective at preventing deaths, as Carl Shulman does here. In that case, your view of the badness of death becomes relevant. But I think Carl Shulman’s argument still works even under the Epicurean view.