As far as attempting to overcome coercion-based objections to higher compensation:
I wonder what the advantages and disadvantages of coupling increased compensation with financial exclusion criteria would be. If the potential volunteer is living paycheck-to-paycheck, or is deep in debt, the $20K offer might be an undue influence in a way it would not be for other potential volunteers. That sounds a bit paternalistic, but I’d submit that the source of the paternalism was the opponents of higher compensation in the first place.
Another coercion-reducing approach might be to put the extra compensation in a trust where it would be prudently invested but remain inaccessible to the participant for 10-30 years. The volunteer still gets the appropriate amount of compensation, but the fact that the compensation is significantly delayed makes coercion arguments significantly weaker to me. One can’t be coerced by present realities, because the extra compensation won’t help them. One potential complication is that the trust would need to be designed in a way that prevented assignment of the right of a payout to a third party (in exchange for immediate cash), but that is probably doable with the right pooled-trust design.
The extra “compensation” could be a donation by the study sponsor to their DAF, and allowing the donor to “recommend” (read: decide) what non-profit the money was regranted to. Note that many charitably-minded people (e.g., GWWC pledgers) could funge this allocation out by treating themselves as having earned the extra money and donated it to charity. In that case, they would end up with the same amount of money as in a direct payment.
And that may be a feature rather than a bug: this funging option is only open to people who were doing a decent bit to charity already. Given that trait, they are less likely to be doing the study primarily for financial gain. Moreover, if they really want more money, they have a much easier way to do that than being infected with Hep C;: they can quickly reduce their charitable contributions instead.
Finally, the study sponsor could fund an insurance policy paying out a fairly large sum to anyone who is later diagnosed with liver cancer or other serious liver dysfunction. This would not be contingent on a showing of a causal connection between the Hep C infection and liver problems, but (for moral hazard reasons) might would need a reduction or exclusion if the balance of probabilities showed that alcohol abuse was a material contributing factor.
This is less likely to look objectionable because it looks and feels like an injury-compensation scheme, and because it is both distant and conjectural.
Assuming that the increased risk of liver problems from study participation is near-zero, this is actually a morbid lottery ticket. Instead of getting an extra $15,000 upfront as compensation, you get a 5% chance of getting $300,000 (adjusted for inflation / investment gains).
As far as attempting to overcome coercion-based objections to higher compensation:
I wonder what the advantages and disadvantages of coupling increased compensation with financial exclusion criteria would be. If the potential volunteer is living paycheck-to-paycheck, or is deep in debt, the $20K offer might be an undue influence in a way it would not be for other potential volunteers. That sounds a bit paternalistic, but I’d submit that the source of the paternalism was the opponents of higher compensation in the first place.
Another coercion-reducing approach might be to put the extra compensation in a trust where it would be prudently invested but remain inaccessible to the participant for 10-30 years. The volunteer still gets the appropriate amount of compensation, but the fact that the compensation is significantly delayed makes coercion arguments significantly weaker to me. One can’t be coerced by present realities, because the extra compensation won’t help them. One potential complication is that the trust would need to be designed in a way that prevented assignment of the right of a payout to a third party (in exchange for immediate cash), but that is probably doable with the right pooled-trust design.
The extra “compensation” could be a donation by the study sponsor to their DAF, and allowing the donor to “recommend” (read: decide) what non-profit the money was regranted to. Note that many charitably-minded people (e.g., GWWC pledgers) could funge this allocation out by treating themselves as having earned the extra money and donated it to charity. In that case, they would end up with the same amount of money as in a direct payment.
And that may be a feature rather than a bug: this funging option is only open to people who were doing a decent bit to charity already. Given that trait, they are less likely to be doing the study primarily for financial gain. Moreover, if they really want more money, they have a much easier way to do that than being infected with Hep C;: they can quickly reduce their charitable contributions instead.
Finally, the study sponsor could fund an insurance policy paying out a fairly large sum to anyone who is later diagnosed with liver cancer or other serious liver dysfunction. This would not be contingent on a showing of a causal connection between the Hep C infection and liver problems, but (for moral hazard reasons) might would need a reduction or exclusion if the balance of probabilities showed that alcohol abuse was a material contributing factor.
This is less likely to look objectionable because it looks and feels like an injury-compensation scheme, and because it is both distant and conjectural.
Assuming that the increased risk of liver problems from study participation is near-zero, this is actually a morbid lottery ticket. Instead of getting an extra $15,000 upfront as compensation, you get a 5% chance of getting $300,000 (adjusted for inflation / investment gains).