Hi Emily. I’ve written a post about how to handle moral uncertainty about moral weights across animals, including humans: Solution to the two envelopes problem for moral weights. It responds directly to Holden’s writing on the topic. In short, I think Open Phil should evaluate opportunities for helping humans and nonhumans relative to human moral weights, like comparison method A from Holden’s post. This is because we directly value that with which we’re familiar, e.g. our own experiences, and we have just regular empirical (not moral) uncertainty about its nature and whether and to what extent other animals have similar relevant capacities.
Hi Emily. I’ve written a post about how to handle moral uncertainty about moral weights across animals, including humans: Solution to the two envelopes problem for moral weights. It responds directly to Holden’s writing on the topic. In short, I think Open Phil should evaluate opportunities for helping humans and nonhumans relative to human moral weights, like comparison method A from Holden’s post. This is because we directly value that with which we’re familiar, e.g. our own experiences, and we have just regular empirical (not moral) uncertainty about its nature and whether and to what extent other animals have similar relevant capacities.