There’s an important qualifier here: it is extremely hard for a public figure (including a “limited-purpose public figure”) to win a libel suit in the United States. I would submit that most of the inhibitory effect of libel law in the U.S. as it relates to public figures comes from the fear of litigation, or the costs of litigation, rather than the risk of an actual-malice finding at trial. (Actual malice requires a showing that the speaker knew that the statement was false, or acted with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Mere negligence isn’t enough.)
I bring that up because I don’t think libel law causes newspapers to insist that everything derogatory that they print about a person be “verified with hard, unambiguous evidence” unless you water that term down a lot.
There’s an important qualifier here: it is extremely hard for a public figure (including a “limited-purpose public figure”) to win a libel suit in the United States. I would submit that most of the inhibitory effect of libel law in the U.S. as it relates to public figures comes from the fear of litigation, or the costs of litigation, rather than the risk of an actual-malice finding at trial. (Actual malice requires a showing that the speaker knew that the statement was false, or acted with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Mere negligence isn’t enough.)
I bring that up because I don’t think libel law causes newspapers to insist that everything derogatory that they print about a person be “verified with hard, unambiguous evidence” unless you water that term down a lot.