Coming back to this, since Iāve become more sympathetic to (asymmetric) narrow person-affecting views recently, because of this and sympathies to actualism.
5.1. A trilemma for narrow views
Hereās a problem for narrow views. Consider:
Expanded Non-Identity
(1) Amy 1
(2) Bobby 100
(3) Amy 10, Bobby 10
(...)
Only option (2) is permissible
Now we can complete the trilemma for narrow views. If neither of (1) and (3) is permissible in Expanded Non-Identity, it must be that only (2) is permissible. But if only (2) is permissible, then narrow views imply:
Losers Can Dislodge Winners:
Adding some option X to an option set can make it wrong to choose a previously-permissible option Y, even though choosing X is itself wrong in the resulting option set.[10]
Thatās because narrow views imply that each of (1) and (2) is permissible in One-Shot Non-Identity. So if only (2) is permissible in Expanded Non-Identity, then adding (3) to our option set has made it wrong to choose (1) even though choosing (3) is itself wrong in Expanded Non-Identity.
Thatās a peculiar implication. Itās a deontic version of an old anecdote about the philosopher Sidney Morgenbesser. Hereās how that story goes. Morgenbesser is offered a choice between apple pie and blueberry pie, and he orders the apple. Shortly after, the waiter returns to say that cherry pie is also an option, to which Morgenbesser replies, āIn that case, Iāll have the blueberry.ā
I suspect this is a misleading analogy. In the case of pies, you havenāt given any reason why they would change their mind, and itās hard to imagine one to which anyone would be sympathetic (but maybe someone could have reasons, and then itās not my place to judge them!). That could explain its apparent peculiarity. Itās just not very psychologically plausible, because people donāt think of pies or food in that way in practice.
But we have an argument for why we would change our mind in the expanded non-identity case: we follow the logic of narrow person-affecting views (with those implications), to which we are sympathetic. If the reasons for such a narrow person-affecting view seem to someone to be good, then the implications shouldnāt seem peculiar.
The pattern is even stranger in our deontic case.
Iād say itās less strange, because we already have a more psychologically plausible explanation, i.e. person-affecting intuitions. Why do you think itās stranger?
Imagine instead that the waiter is offering Morgenbesser the options in Expanded Non-Identity.[11] Initially the choice is between (1) and (2), and Morgenbesser permissibly opts for (1). Then the waiter returns to say that (3) is also an option, to which Morgenbesser replies, āIn that case, Iām morally required to switch to (2).āThe upshot is that the waiter can force Morgenbesserās hand by adding options that are wrong to choose in the resulting option set. And turning the case around, the waiter could expand Morgenbesserās menu of permissible options by taking wrong options off the table. That seems implausible.
I think this is too quick, and, from my perspective, i.e. with my intuitions, a mistake.
I donāt find the implications implausible or very counterintuitive (perhaps for the reasons below).
A different way of framing this is that the waiter is revealing information about which options are permissible. The waiter has private information, i.e. whether or not a given option will be available, which decides which ones are permissible. In general, when someone has private information about your options (or their consequences), they can force you to reevaluate your options and force your hand by revealing the info. The narrow person-affecting response is a special case of that. So, your argument would prove too much: it would say itās implausible to have your hand forced by the revelation of private information, which is obviously not true. (And I think thereās no Dutch book or money pump with foreseeable loss here; you just have to be a sophisticated reasoner and anticipate what the waiter will do, and recognize what your actual option set will be.)
Another framing is basically the one by Lukas, or the object version of preferentialism/āparticipant model of Rabinowicz & Ćsterberg, 1996. Youāre changing the perspectives or normative stances you take, depending on who comes to exist. Itās not surprising that you would violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives in certain ways, when you have to shift perspectives like this, and it just follows on specific views.
In general, I think itās somewhat problematic/āuncharitable to call something implausible or that it āseems implausibleā and end the discussion there, because people vary substantially in what they find implausible, counterintuitive, etc.. When someone does this, I get the impression that they take their arguments to be more universally appealing (or āobjectiveā) than they actually are. Unless they make clear theyāre speaking only for themselves. Maybe āseemsā should normally be understood as speaking only for yourself and your own intuitions, but Iād find this less frustrating if it were made explicit.
I do wonder if your example suggests that in practice you should often or usually act like you hold a wide view, though. If youāre indifferent between (1) Amy at 1 and (2) Bobby at 100 when they are (so far) the only two options, you should anticipate that (3) or similar options might become available, and so opt for (2) in case.
Coming back to this, since Iāve become more sympathetic to (asymmetric) narrow person-affecting views recently, because of this and sympathies to actualism.
I suspect this is a misleading analogy. In the case of pies, you havenāt given any reason why they would change their mind, and itās hard to imagine one to which anyone would be sympathetic (but maybe someone could have reasons, and then itās not my place to judge them!). That could explain its apparent peculiarity. Itās just not very psychologically plausible, because people donāt think of pies or food in that way in practice.
But we have an argument for why we would change our mind in the expanded non-identity case: we follow the logic of narrow person-affecting views (with those implications), to which we are sympathetic. If the reasons for such a narrow person-affecting view seem to someone to be good, then the implications shouldnāt seem peculiar.
Iād say itās less strange, because we already have a more psychologically plausible explanation, i.e. person-affecting intuitions. Why do you think itās stranger?
I think this is too quick, and, from my perspective, i.e. with my intuitions, a mistake.
I donāt find the implications implausible or very counterintuitive (perhaps for the reasons below).
A different way of framing this is that the waiter is revealing information about which options are permissible. The waiter has private information, i.e. whether or not a given option will be available, which decides which ones are permissible. In general, when someone has private information about your options (or their consequences), they can force you to reevaluate your options and force your hand by revealing the info. The narrow person-affecting response is a special case of that. So, your argument would prove too much: it would say itās implausible to have your hand forced by the revelation of private information, which is obviously not true. (And I think thereās no Dutch book or money pump with foreseeable loss here; you just have to be a sophisticated reasoner and anticipate what the waiter will do, and recognize what your actual option set will be.)
Another framing is basically the one by Lukas, or the object version of preferentialism/āparticipant model of Rabinowicz & Ćsterberg, 1996. Youāre changing the perspectives or normative stances you take, depending on who comes to exist. Itās not surprising that you would violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives in certain ways, when you have to shift perspectives like this, and it just follows on specific views.
In general, I think itās somewhat problematic/āuncharitable to call something implausible or that it āseems implausibleā and end the discussion there, because people vary substantially in what they find implausible, counterintuitive, etc.. When someone does this, I get the impression that they take their arguments to be more universally appealing (or āobjectiveā) than they actually are. Unless they make clear theyāre speaking only for themselves. Maybe āseemsā should normally be understood as speaking only for yourself and your own intuitions, but Iād find this less frustrating if it were made explicit.
I do wonder if your example suggests that in practice you should often or usually act like you hold a wide view, though. If youāre indifferent between (1) Amy at 1 and (2) Bobby at 100 when they are (so far) the only two options, you should anticipate that (3) or similar options might become available, and so opt for (2) in case.