Ah, I should have read more closely. I misunderstood and was unnecessarily harsh. Iâm sorry.
I think your response to Risberg is right.
I would still say that permissibility could depend on lever-lashing (in some sense?) because it affects what options are available, though, but in a different way. Here is the view Iâd defend:
Ahead of time, any remaining option or sequence of choices that ends up like âJust Amyâ will be impermissible if thereâs an available option or sequence of choices that ends up like âJust Bobbyâ (assuming no uncertainty). Available options/âsequences of choices are otherwise permissible by default.
Here are the consequences in your thought experiments:
In the four button case, the âJust Amyâ button is impermissible, because thereâs a âJust Bobbyâ button.
In the lashed levers case, itâs impermissible to pull either, because this would give âJust Amyâ, and the available alternative is âJust Bobbyâ.
In the unlashed levers case,
Ahead of time, each lever is permissible to pull and permissible to not pull, as long as you wonât pull both (or leave both pulled, in case you can unpull). Ahead of time, pulling both levers is impermissible, because that would give âJust Amyâ, and âJust Bobbyâ is still available. This agrees with 1 and 2.
But if you have already pulled one lever (and this is irreversible), then âJust Bobbyâ is no longer available (either Amy is/âwill be created, or Bobby wonât be created), and pulling the other is permissible, which would give âJust Amyâ. âJust Amyâ is therefore permissible at this point.
As we see in 3.b., âJust Bobbyâ gets ruled out, and then âJust Amyâ becomes permissible after and because of that, but only after âJust Bobbyâ is ruled out, not before. Permissibility depends on what options are still available, specifically if âJust Bobbyâ is still available in these thought experiments. âJust Bobbyâ is still available in 2 and 3.a.
In your post, you wrote:
Pulling both levers should either be permissible in both cases or wrong in both cases.
This is actually true ahead of time, in 2 and 3.a, with pulling both together impermissible. But already having pulled a lever and then pulling the other is permissible, in 3.b.
Maybe this is getting pedantic and off-track, but âalready having pulled a leverâ is not an action available to you, itâs just a state of the world. Similarly, âpulling both leversâ is not an action available to you after you pulled one; you only get to pull the other lever. âPulling both leversâ (lashed or unlashed) and âpulling the other lever, after already having pulled one leverâ have different effects on the world, i.e. the first creates Amy and prevents Bobby, while the second only does one of the two. I donât think itâs too unusual to be sensitive to these differences. Different effects â different evaluations.
Still, the end state âJust Amyâ itself later becomes permissible/âundominated without lever-lashing, but is impermissible/âdominated ahead of time or with lever lashing.
Ah, I should have read more closely. I misunderstood and was unnecessarily harsh. Iâm sorry.
I think your response to Risberg is right.
I would still say that permissibility could depend on lever-lashing (in some sense?) because it affects what options are available, though, but in a different way. Here is the view Iâd defend:
Here are the consequences in your thought experiments:
In the four button case, the âJust Amyâ button is impermissible, because thereâs a âJust Bobbyâ button.
In the lashed levers case, itâs impermissible to pull either, because this would give âJust Amyâ, and the available alternative is âJust Bobbyâ.
In the unlashed levers case,
Ahead of time, each lever is permissible to pull and permissible to not pull, as long as you wonât pull both (or leave both pulled, in case you can unpull). Ahead of time, pulling both levers is impermissible, because that would give âJust Amyâ, and âJust Bobbyâ is still available. This agrees with 1 and 2.
But if you have already pulled one lever (and this is irreversible), then âJust Bobbyâ is no longer available (either Amy is/âwill be created, or Bobby wonât be created), and pulling the other is permissible, which would give âJust Amyâ. âJust Amyâ is therefore permissible at this point.
As we see in 3.b., âJust Bobbyâ gets ruled out, and then âJust Amyâ becomes permissible after and because of that, but only after âJust Bobbyâ is ruled out, not before. Permissibility depends on what options are still available, specifically if âJust Bobbyâ is still available in these thought experiments. âJust Bobbyâ is still available in 2 and 3.a.
In your post, you wrote:
This is actually true ahead of time, in 2 and 3.a, with pulling both together impermissible. But already having pulled a lever and then pulling the other is permissible, in 3.b.
Maybe this is getting pedantic and off-track, but âalready having pulled a leverâ is not an action available to you, itâs just a state of the world. Similarly, âpulling both leversâ is not an action available to you after you pulled one; you only get to pull the other lever. âPulling both leversâ (lashed or unlashed) and âpulling the other lever, after already having pulled one leverâ have different effects on the world, i.e. the first creates Amy and prevents Bobby, while the second only does one of the two. I donât think itâs too unusual to be sensitive to these differences. Different effects â different evaluations.
Still, the end state âJust Amyâ itself later becomes permissible/âundominated without lever-lashing, but is impermissible/âdominated ahead of time or with lever lashing.