From a longtermist (~totalist classical utilitarian) perspective, there’s a huge difference between ~99% and 100% of the population dying, if humanity recovers in the former case, but not the latter. Just looking at GCRs on their own mostly misses this nuance.
I would be curious to know your thougths on my post arguing that decreasing the risk of human extinction is not astronomically cost-effective.
From a longtermist (~totalist classical utilitarian) perspective, preventing a GCR doesn’t differentiate between “humanity prevents GCRs and realises 1% of it’s potential” and “humanity prevents GCRs realises 99% of its potential”
The same applies to preventing human extinction over a given period. Humans could go extinct just after the period, or go on to an astronomically valuable, and I believe the former is much more likely.
From a longtermist (~suffering focused) perspective, reducing GCRs might be net-negative if the future is (in expectation) net-negative
This also applies to reducing the risk of human extinction.
Hi Tom.
I would be curious to know your thougths on my post arguing that decreasing the risk of human extinction is not astronomically cost-effective.
The same applies to preventing human extinction over a given period. Humans could go extinct just after the period, or go on to an astronomically valuable, and I believe the former is much more likely.
This also applies to reducing the risk of human extinction.