I found it a bit hard to discern what constructive points he was trying to make amidst all the snark. But the following seemed like a key passage in the overall argument:
Making responsible choices, I came to realize, means accepting well-known risks of harm. Which absolutely does not mean that âaid doesnât work.â There are many good people in aid working hard on the ground, often making tough calls as they weigh benefits and costs. Giving money to aid can be admirable tooâdoctors, after all, still prescribe drugs with known side effects. Yet what no one in aid should say, I came to think, is that all theyâre doing is improving poor peopleâs lives.
⌠This expert tried to persuade Ord that aid was much more complex than âpills improve lives.â Over dinner I pressed Ord on these pointsâin fact I harangued him, out of frustration and from the shame I felt at my younger self. Early on in the conversation, he developed what Iâve come to think of as âthe EA glaze.â⌠Ord, it seemed, wanted to be the heroâthe hero by being smartâjust as I had. Behind his glazed eyes, the hero is thinking, âTheyâre trying to stop me.â
Putting aside the implicit status games and weird psychological projection, I donât understand what practical point Wenar is trying to make here. If the aid is indeed net good, as he seems to grant, then âpills improve livesâ seems like the most important insight not to lose sight of. And if someone starts âharanguingâ you for affirming this important insight, it does seem like it could come across as trying to prevent that net good from happening. (I donât see any reason to personalize the concern, as about âstopping meââthat just seems blatantly uncharitable.)
It sounds like Wenar just wants more public affirmations of causal complexity to precede any claim about our potential to do good? But it surely depends on context whether thatâs a good idea. Too much detail, especially extraneous detail that doesnât affect the bottom line recommendation, could easily prove distracting and cause people (like, seemingly, Wenar himself) to lose sight of the bottom line of what matters most here.
So that section just seemed kind of silly. There was a more reasonable point mixed in with the unreasonable in the next section:
GiveWell still doesnât factor in many well-known negative effects of aid⌠Today GiveWellâs front page advertises only the number of lives it thinks it has saved. A more honest front page would also display the number of deaths it believes it has caused.
The initial complaint here seems fine: presumably GiveWell could (marginally) improve their cost-effectiveness models by trying to incorporate various risks or costs that it sounds like they currently donât consider. Mind you, if nobody else has any better estimates, then complaining that the best-grounded estimates in the world arenât yet perfect seems a bit precious. Then the closing suggestion that they prominently highlight expected deaths (from indirect causes like bandits killing people while trying to steal charity money) is just dopey. Ordinary readers would surely misread that as suggesting that the interventions were somehow directly killing people. Obviously the better-justified display is the net effect in lives saved. But weâre not given any reason to expect that GiveWellâs current estimates here are far off.
Q: Does Wenar endorse inaction?
Wenarâs âmost important [point] to make to EAsâ (skipping over his weird projection about egotism) is that âIf we decide to intervene in poor peopleâs lives, we should do so responsiblyâideally by shifting our power to them and being accountable for our actions.â
The overwhelmingly thrust of Wenarâs articleâfrom the opening jab about asking EAs âhow many people theyâve killedâ, to the conditional I bolded aboveâseems to be to frame charitable giving as a morally risky endeavor, in contrast to the implicit safety of just doing nothing and letting people die.
I think thatâs a terrible frame. Itâs philosophically mistaken: letting people die from preventable causes is not a morally safe or innocent alternative (as is precisely the central lesson of Singerâs famous article). And it seems practically dangerous to publicly promote this bad moral frame, as he is doing here. The most predictable consequence is to discourage people from doing âriskily goodâ things like giving to charity. Since he seems to grant that aid is overall good and admirable, it seems like by his own lights he should regard his own article as harmful. Itâs weird.
(If he just wants to advocate for more GiveDirectly-style anti-paternalistic interventions that âshift our power to themâ, that seems fine but obviously doesnât justify the other 95% of the article.)
I was disappointed GiveDirectly wasnât mentioned given that seems to be more what he would favour. The closing anecdote about the surfer-philosopher donating money to Bali seems like a proto-GiveDirectly approach but presumably a lot less efficient without the infrastructure to do it at scale.
I think his take on GiveDirectly is likely to be very similarâhe would point to the fraud and note that neither them or any of their evaluators took into account the harms caused by the beneficiaries of that fraud in their calculations. And I donât think that that would be an unfair criticism (if delivered with a bit less snark).
1)I think it is pretty unclear how much harm was actually done here, other than the loss of money for the people who would otherwise have received it, who would also have gotten 0 money if GiveDirectly didnât exist. (That doesnât mean zero harm, since itâs worse to think youâll get money and not receive it.) As far as I can tell from the link, the money was stolen by local GiveDirectly staff, not armed militias or governments that might have spent on it buying guns or improving their ability to extort more money from others. (There might even have been some indirect gain for locals in having the money reach the Congo at all, also. It could easily have been spent locally Harmful things also have secondary effects that donât necessarily have the same sign as the primary thing.) Itâs possible that if theyâd given more details of how the fraud was carried out, more harms would be evident though. (Which is why I say âunclearâ not âit seems like there wasnât that muchâ).
2) It seems like it was a tiny fraction of GDâs giving that year, so the bad effects would have to be super-large in order for it to make much difference to the overall value of GDâs work. (I guess one possible response is that where you find one bad unintended consequence there might be others.)
I agree with both your points. I think the thrust of Leifâs argument, rather, is that no work was done to clarify the extent of those harms. They just say âwe apologise to people counting on thisâ and quote statistics on how bad the militias in the area are.
On (2), I hope it was clear to anyone reading the article that Leif would like EAs to think in a negative-utilitarian way. I sincerely doubt he cares what proportion of the overall value of GiveDirectlyâs work it was if a harm was done.
âNegative utilitarianâ isnât the right term here. Negative utilitarianism is the view that you should minimize total suffering. It doesnât say your not allowed to cause some suffering in doing so, so long as you take the action that reduces suffering the most on net. The âbenefitsâ of Give Directlyâs work are a mixture of suffering reduction and positive stuff, and the harms of the theft are also a mixture of suffering and positive benefits blocked. NU is the view that you should only care about suffering and not the positive benefits in assessing whether GD does more good than harm .Itâs not a view about not doing harm instrumentally. (And in fact, any sensible negative utilitarian will recognize that increasing positive happiness actually usually also decreases suffering for that person, since it helps prevent boredom etc.)
Insofar as Wenar is claiming that you should never do anything that is even an indirect cause of harms committed by other people, even if itâs a net benefit, I think that is just not at all convincing, for reasons both I and Richard Y Chappell have given elsewhere: it would paralyze all action by anyone ever, and it doesnât have the common sense support of âdonât do evil things, even to achieve good outcomesâ. I suppose someone could argue the harm was direct here though, since it was GDâs own staff who stole the money?
On the other hand, if his claim is just that GD might be doing more harm than good, then the specifics of how much money was stolen v. how much money GD gives out are relevant. If his claim is that GiveWell should incorporate harms more into the stuff they right up about the charities, again, the actual importance of the harms is relevant, since GiveWell canât write up everything, and should include/âexclude stuff from right-ups on the basis of how important that stuff is. If his claim is just that GiveWell needs to take the caveats about indirect harms they already include in long detailed reports and display them prominently in summaries, again, the level of the harms seems important, because the summary should be giving the most important stuff.
I found it a bit hard to discern what constructive points he was trying to make amidst all the snark. But the following seemed like a key passage in the overall argument:
Putting aside the implicit status games and weird psychological projection, I donât understand what practical point Wenar is trying to make here. If the aid is indeed net good, as he seems to grant, then âpills improve livesâ seems like the most important insight not to lose sight of. And if someone starts âharanguingâ you for affirming this important insight, it does seem like it could come across as trying to prevent that net good from happening. (I donât see any reason to personalize the concern, as about âstopping meââthat just seems blatantly uncharitable.)
It sounds like Wenar just wants more public affirmations of causal complexity to precede any claim about our potential to do good? But it surely depends on context whether thatâs a good idea. Too much detail, especially extraneous detail that doesnât affect the bottom line recommendation, could easily prove distracting and cause people (like, seemingly, Wenar himself) to lose sight of the bottom line of what matters most here.
So that section just seemed kind of silly. There was a more reasonable point mixed in with the unreasonable in the next section:
The initial complaint here seems fine: presumably GiveWell could (marginally) improve their cost-effectiveness models by trying to incorporate various risks or costs that it sounds like they currently donât consider. Mind you, if nobody else has any better estimates, then complaining that the best-grounded estimates in the world arenât yet perfect seems a bit precious. Then the closing suggestion that they prominently highlight expected deaths (from indirect causes like bandits killing people while trying to steal charity money) is just dopey. Ordinary readers would surely misread that as suggesting that the interventions were somehow directly killing people. Obviously the better-justified display is the net effect in lives saved. But weâre not given any reason to expect that GiveWellâs current estimates here are far off.
Q: Does Wenar endorse inaction?
Wenarâs âmost important [point] to make to EAsâ (skipping over his weird projection about egotism) is that âIf we decide to intervene in poor peopleâs lives, we should do so responsiblyâideally by shifting our power to them and being accountable for our actions.â
The overwhelmingly thrust of Wenarâs articleâfrom the opening jab about asking EAs âhow many people theyâve killedâ, to the conditional I bolded aboveâseems to be to frame charitable giving as a morally risky endeavor, in contrast to the implicit safety of just doing nothing and letting people die.
I think thatâs a terrible frame. Itâs philosophically mistaken: letting people die from preventable causes is not a morally safe or innocent alternative (as is precisely the central lesson of Singerâs famous article). And it seems practically dangerous to publicly promote this bad moral frame, as he is doing here. The most predictable consequence is to discourage people from doing âriskily goodâ things like giving to charity. Since he seems to grant that aid is overall good and admirable, it seems like by his own lights he should regard his own article as harmful. Itâs weird.
(If he just wants to advocate for more GiveDirectly-style anti-paternalistic interventions that âshift our power to themâ, that seems fine but obviously doesnât justify the other 95% of the article.)
I was disappointed GiveDirectly wasnât mentioned given that seems to be more what he would favour. The closing anecdote about the surfer-philosopher donating money to Bali seems like a proto-GiveDirectly approach but presumably a lot less efficient without the infrastructure to do it at scale.
I think his take on GiveDirectly is likely to be very similarâhe would point to the fraud and note that neither them or any of their evaluators took into account the harms caused by the beneficiaries of that fraud in their calculations. And I donât think that that would be an unfair criticism (if delivered with a bit less snark).
1)I think it is pretty unclear how much harm was actually done here, other than the loss of money for the people who would otherwise have received it, who would also have gotten 0 money if GiveDirectly didnât exist. (That doesnât mean zero harm, since itâs worse to think youâll get money and not receive it.) As far as I can tell from the link, the money was stolen by local GiveDirectly staff, not armed militias or governments that might have spent on it buying guns or improving their ability to extort more money from others. (There might even have been some indirect gain for locals in having the money reach the Congo at all, also. It could easily have been spent locally Harmful things also have secondary effects that donât necessarily have the same sign as the primary thing.) Itâs possible that if theyâd given more details of how the fraud was carried out, more harms would be evident though. (Which is why I say âunclearâ not âit seems like there wasnât that muchâ).
2) It seems like it was a tiny fraction of GDâs giving that year, so the bad effects would have to be super-large in order for it to make much difference to the overall value of GDâs work. (I guess one possible response is that where you find one bad unintended consequence there might be others.)
I agree with both your points. I think the thrust of Leifâs argument, rather, is that no work was done to clarify the extent of those harms. They just say âwe apologise to people counting on thisâ and quote statistics on how bad the militias in the area are.
On (2), I hope it was clear to anyone reading the article that Leif would like EAs to think in a negative-utilitarian way. I sincerely doubt he cares what proportion of the overall value of GiveDirectlyâs work it was if a harm was done.
âNegative utilitarianâ isnât the right term here. Negative utilitarianism is the view that you should minimize total suffering. It doesnât say your not allowed to cause some suffering in doing so, so long as you take the action that reduces suffering the most on net. The âbenefitsâ of Give Directlyâs work are a mixture of suffering reduction and positive stuff, and the harms of the theft are also a mixture of suffering and positive benefits blocked. NU is the view that you should only care about suffering and not the positive benefits in assessing whether GD does more good than harm .Itâs not a view about not doing harm instrumentally. (And in fact, any sensible negative utilitarian will recognize that increasing positive happiness actually usually also decreases suffering for that person, since it helps prevent boredom etc.)
Insofar as Wenar is claiming that you should never do anything that is even an indirect cause of harms committed by other people, even if itâs a net benefit, I think that is just not at all convincing, for reasons both I and Richard Y Chappell have given elsewhere: it would paralyze all action by anyone ever, and it doesnât have the common sense support of âdonât do evil things, even to achieve good outcomesâ. I suppose someone could argue the harm was direct here though, since it was GDâs own staff who stole the money?
On the other hand, if his claim is just that GD might be doing more harm than good, then the specifics of how much money was stolen v. how much money GD gives out are relevant. If his claim is that GiveWell should incorporate harms more into the stuff they right up about the charities, again, the actual importance of the harms is relevant, since GiveWell canât write up everything, and should include/âexclude stuff from right-ups on the basis of how important that stuff is. If his claim is just that GiveWell needs to take the caveats about indirect harms they already include in long detailed reports and display them prominently in summaries, again, the level of the harms seems important, because the summary should be giving the most important stuff.
Same, Oscar! I hope to ask him about this