Basically, if the creator has good justification for their belief, they should be able to give you that justification. If they canât, then why does their belief mean anything?
From a Bayesian perspective: if I hold credence P in X, and the creator says their credence is 100%, I update toward them because they are more reliable. Same way Iâd move toward âvaccines workâ if I were agnostic and learned that 90% of scientists believe they do (i.e. I donât need to see each [or any] scientistâs reasoning/âevidence to update toward their view). So the creatorâs belief can be evidence via reliability.
I agree that if the creator believes X thereâs some evidence for X somewhere; I just donât think that evidence has to be revealed for me to update. (Note: Scientists have a track record and the creator doesnât, but itâs not the track record itself that makes me update, itâs reliability; for scientists I get reliability via their track record, and for the creator itâs a medium-confidence assumption [less-defensible, I know])
Also, âif they canât give you the justificationâ assumes silence = inability. A creator stating a belief without the reasoning/âevidence doesnât mean they canât do so, just that they didnât. Besides, maybe they canât communicate; does that mean there is nothing to communicate? I donât think so. Either way (or other ways I canât think of, beyond choosing not to and not being able to communicate), I think learning about the creatorâs belief warrants an update.
Also, itâs not just the intuitions themselves that could change, but the confidence in them. Our intuitions (esp. when taken to their logical conclusions) contradict each other a lot; however, when doing moral philosophy, we often prioritize the higher-confidence one (e.g., my intuition that harming someone with no benefit to any is bad, beats my intuition that murderers deserve punishment). Confidence seems to vary between people (anecdotally), so if we were to scale up cognitively, I imagine that the intuitions we think will win could change.
From a Bayesian perspective: if I hold credence P in X, and the creator says their credence is 100%, I update toward them because they are more reliable. Same way Iâd move toward âvaccines workâ if I were agnostic and learned that 90% of scientists believe they do (i.e. I donât need to see each [or any] scientistâs reasoning/âevidence to update toward their view). So the creatorâs belief can be evidence via reliability.
I agree that if the creator believes X thereâs some evidence for X somewhere; I just donât think that evidence has to be revealed for me to update. (Note: Scientists have a track record and the creator doesnât, but itâs not the track record itself that makes me update, itâs reliability; for scientists I get reliability via their track record, and for the creator itâs a medium-confidence assumption [less-defensible, I know])
Also, âif they canât give you the justificationâ assumes silence = inability. A creator stating a belief without the reasoning/âevidence doesnât mean they canât do so, just that they didnât. Besides, maybe they canât communicate; does that mean there is nothing to communicate? I donât think so. Either way (or other ways I canât think of, beyond choosing not to and not being able to communicate), I think learning about the creatorâs belief warrants an update.
On 1, Iâm not sure I understand why moral intuitions wouldnât change in a CEV. Why would intutions not be partly downstream of cognitive capacity? (Also: this is probably cherry-picking (Googled the question), but people with higher cognitive (verabl) abilities seem to have weaker âpurityâ-based moral intutions.)
Also, itâs not just the intuitions themselves that could change, but the confidence in them. Our intuitions (esp. when taken to their logical conclusions) contradict each other a lot; however, when doing moral philosophy, we often prioritize the higher-confidence one (e.g., my intuition that harming someone with no benefit to any is bad, beats my intuition that murderers deserve punishment). Confidence seems to vary between people (anecdotally), so if we were to scale up cognitively, I imagine that the intuitions we think will win could change.
On 2, I agree. Didnât think of this.