Vadim, discussing with you will cause me to be more explicit about the time involved in future writing. Thank you. As I first argued, 71 years is a long time, which cross-sectional results do not consider. I respond more completely below.
“Yes, I am definitely talking about WELLBYs. I meant to say that there are two ways of looking at both income and SWB, a level at a point in time, and the sum of the levels per year (we can think of those as the area under the curve plotted across time). We can call the summed versions INCYs and WELLBYs, and the point in time estimates Income and SWB. So I think in year 13.5, we can say that we get .2 WELLBYs for 1 INCY. Or alternatively, we can say that we get .027 SWBs for 14% Income gain. I don’t think that we should be comparing SWBs (a point in time estimate) to INCYs (a summation estimate).”
Response I agree with part, in year 13.5 we get .2 WELLBYs for 1 INCY (when INCY equals an income doubling),
and adjusted this statement slightly, 0.027 SWB points for a 14% increase in growth for one year.
However, a 14% increase in growth is rarely observed and never sustained. .002 does not apply to such changes.
“To illustrate I’ll try to go back to the example of boosting Ethiopia’s growth by 1pp, using your coefficient of 0.002. For simplicity, let’s say that Ethiopia starts with a per capita GDP of $1000, a SWB of 4, and a real growth rate of 0%. It seems like we agree that “The population in year 13.5 reports .027 greater SWB points after an increase in growth by one percent.” So if we boost growth to 1% I think we agree that in year 71 Ethiopia would have a per capita GDP of $2000 (versus the counterfactual $1000) and a SWB = 4 + 71*.002=4.14.”
Agreed
“Now to address our discussion on (3) in the below thread, you say: “As you point out, our results include larger coefficient estimates using different specifications, yet we still argue they are not economically significant,” and then in response to my comment that “those coefficients seem to be close to what we would expect from the cross-sectional data,” you comment “I don’t agree that the results are similar in size.”
Let’s assume we accept the coefficient from your regression in table 3, column 5: 0.007. That would imply that in year 71 Ethiopia would have roughly twice the GDP than it would have had counterfactually (compared to the 0% growth world), and a SWB = 4+71*.007 = 4.5. This is 0.5 points higher than the counterfactual.”
Agreed with the math, however, the coefficient is wrong. You should add the negative coefficient on the interaction term to get the correct relationship 0.007 − 0.005. The largest relationship applies in the transition countries 0.007 + 0.003, but as argued in the paper, they are exceptional cases. And, the WVS/EVS results show smaller coefficients.
“Now let’s imagine that in the cross section regression Ethiopia and country X are both exactly on our regression line. Ethiopia is at $1000 and SWB of 4, country X is at $2000 and SWP of 4.5 (That is roughly where the cross sectional regression lines fall as I argue in my post, and as you can see from the graph I include). If there were no Easterlin Paradox, we would expect that if Ethiopia gradually got to $2000 GDP, it would move up the regression line to where country X currently is. But it seems like that is exactly what the .007 regression coefficient implies in the preceding paragraph? If so, is this at odds with your response on discussion (3) in the below thread?”
Although the math is correct (assuming 0.007), it took 71 years to achieve the change in SWB, whereas the cross-sectional results do not consider the time involved. As mentioned before 71 years is greater than life expectancy in many countries, and as the WVS/EVS results show, the coefficients are smaller in longer time series.
The coefficient estimates of .002 or .007 apply to long-run sustained growth after accounting for adaptation and social comparison. If you were to double the income of Ethiopians in one year, neither coefficient would apply. We are not sure what applies. Short run growth typically has a larger relationship, the effect of which diminishes over time, possibly to zero, and the benefits of cash transfers do not accrue to the population as a whole.
I don’t think you want to apply our results to what you’re evaluating, especially considering we are talking about the Gallup results and ignoring the EVS/WVS results. They are preferred for long-run periods (still fare less than 71 years) and they reveal smaller, even negative growth relations.
We should be looking at long run outcomes of interventions and then assessing them at scale. It’s possible that many people on the lower end of the income distribution benefit greatly – indeed many economists, even happiness ones, believe this in their bones. We just need more evidence at scale.
“Alternatively, don’t the coefficients from Sacks, Stevenson, and Wolfers 2012 roughly correspond to the larger coefficient estimates in your regressions (since both include 10 year short-term fluctuations)? So if Sacks et. al. convincingly reran their analysis to focus on the same countries and longer time series that you use, and got the same coefficients they did in their paper, would that not update us towards thinking that longitudinal and cross-sectional results might be similar?”
Honestly, I haven’t read the SSW paper in quite some time, in part because of what you reference here, they shorten the length of the time-series and also because they leave out data that was available to them at the time.
My disagreement about the TS and CS studies is the time involved as mentioned above. The CS studies make it seem like we could magically double income and ignore the time involved. Even if the coefficients are the same, the implications are not. Discussing with you brought this to my attention, and I will discuss it more explicitly in future writing.
“I think we could also use a similar argument about the Ethiopian counterfactual SWB = 4 + 71*.002=4.14 to argue that it matches the cash transfer results that I cite in my post.”
See discussion above about time. I simply don’t think my results apply to what you’re assessing.
If I understand correctly, it sounds like we now agree on the math of my post, and on my arguments around which coefficients from cross-sectional vs longitudinal regressions seem to match? But I think we still disagree about whether the impacts of a gradual increase in gdp across time should be compared to cross-sectional differences?
My first thought on our disagreement is that an income doubling is a fairly arbitrary metric. I think it would be equally reasonable to zoom in on the cross sectional graph, and look at the impact of a 1% increase in income. We can imagine country Y on the cross-section graph which lies a little higher than Ethiopia on the regression line in my post. This country would have $1010 per capital GDP and a SWB of 4+1*.007=4.007, versus Ethiopia at $1000 and 4. If we compare this to what we would expect from a .007 coefficient in one of your alternative regressions, it looks like it’s exactly what we would expect from one year of 1% growth vs the counterfactual for Ethiopia? In this case we don’t need to worry about the amount of time it takes to double income, and TS and CS become more intuitively comparable?
My second thought is that if we assume that TS results are not comparable to CS results because they take a long time, wouldn’t that make the existence of the Easterlin Paradox irrelevant for making any judgements about the world? Isn’t the Easterlin Paradox a paradox precisely because we expect the coefficients to match between CS and TS, but they don’t seem to in some specifications?
“we are talking about the Gallup results and ignoring the EVS/WVS results. They are preferred for long-run periods.”
Agreed. I haven’t looked at the EVS/WVS results at all, so there is a good chance that they are less sensitive to the kinds of alternative specifications I tried for the Gallup results.
“It’s possible that many people on the lower end of the income distribution benefit greatly – indeed many economists, even happiness ones, believe this in their bones. We just need more evidence at scale.”
I share the same intuition, and find this an interesting area for further exploration. I would be curious to hear your thoughts on why the “Growth X LDC” coefficients in all of your regressions are negative (which is a surprise to me). This seems to imply that people lower down the income distribution are actually benefiting less from % income increases? Re-running your regressions on just the less-developed countries in your Gallup dataset, I also get smaller coefficients than those for the whole dataset.
“If I understand correctly, it sounds like we now agree on the math of my post, and on my arguments around which coefficients from cross-sectional vs longitudinal regressions seem to match? But I think we still disagree about whether the impacts of a gradual increase in gdp across time should be compared to cross-sectional differences?”
Response: Not quite, I agree with some of the calculations you did in the last post, but not with the overall post and conclusions. The quickest justification for this response is that the EVS/WVS coefficients are smaller and even negative for certain country groups. There’s also the statistical significance to consider, which we have not discussed. There is a large amount of uncertainty in the estimates, and while they could be larger, they could also be zero. But regardless of coefficient, yes, we disagree about the implications of time-series (TS) and cross-sectional (CS) differences.
“My first thought on our disagreement is that an income doubling is a fairly arbitrary metric. I think it would be equally reasonable to zoom in on the cross sectional graph, and look at the impact of a 1% increase in income. We can imagine country Y on the cross-section graph which lies a little higher than Ethiopia on the regression line in my post. This country would have $1010 per capital GDP and a SWB of 4+1*.007=4.007, versus Ethiopia at $1000 and 4. If we compare this to what we would expect from a .007 coefficient in one of your alternative regressions, it looks like it’s exactly what we would expect from one year of 1% growth vs the counterfactual for Ethiopia? In this case we don’t need to worry about the amount of time it takes to double income, and TS and CS become more intuitively comparable?”
Response: You’re right that in that case we do not need to worry about the time involved, but what you’re pointing out is how small the relationship actually is in the cross-section. From the figure, the cross-sectional relationship is: y = −2.955 + 0.342*ln(x). Then a 1 percent increase in income is related to an increase in SWB of approximately 0.342*0.01 = 0.003, which of course is actually smaller than the 0.007 coefficient (note the previous post, 0.007 applies to developed not less developed countries. Also, it is statistically insignificant and could also be zero).
“My second thought is that if we assume that TS results are not comparable to CS results because they take a long time, wouldn’t that make the existence of the Easterlin Paradox irrelevant for making any judgements about the world? Isn’t the Easterlin Paradox a paradox precisely because we expect the coefficients to match between CS and TS, but they don’t seem to in some specifications?”
Response: You’re right that the Paradox is about the contrast between the two types of results. However, it’s not just whether the coefficients match. The CS results are statistically significant and the TS results are generally not statistically significant. A second aspect is that the TS results, even if statistically significant, make it clear how long it would take for SWB to increase. The period necessary is not clear in CS results, which makes it look like the CS results are much larger than the TS results. Your calculation above suggests that the CS results are actually quite small too, or that we need larger changes in income to have meaningful changes in SWB, which as the TS results point out, will take a long time. Another aspect, the Paradox is about the contrast, but the surprising result is how small the TS relation is. Whether there’s a contrast or not, this relation is important for thinking about the world.
“we are talking about the Gallup results and ignoring the EVS/WVS results. They are preferred for long-run periods.”
Agreed. I haven’t looked at the EVS/WVS results at all, so there is a good chance that they are less sensitive to the kinds of alternative specifications I tried for the Gallup results.”
Response: the sensitivity isn’t too important, because the relationships are all small. As stated above, even the CS results are quite small, or we need larger changes in income to have meaningful changes in SWB, which as the TS results point out, will take a long time.
“It’s possible that many people on the lower end of the income distribution benefit greatly – indeed many economists, even happiness ones, believe this in their bones. We just need more evidence at scale.”
“I share the same intuition, and find this an interesting area for further exploration. I would be curious to hear your thoughts on why the “Growth X LDC” coefficients in all of your regressions are negative (which is a surprise to me). This seems to imply that people lower down the income distribution are actually benefiting less from % income increases? Re-running your regressions on just the less-developed countries in your Gallup dataset, I also get smaller coefficients than those for the whole dataset.”
Response: The Growth X LDC coefficient applies to lower income countries not strictly lower income people. The distinction is important because we can expect the mechanisms to be different. The impacts of income within a country are absolute and relative, due to social comparison as well as cost of living. Recall that poverty is usually defined in relative terms, i.e., as 60% of the median. While at the country level, I expect income to operate more in absolute terms. It’s not clear to me why growth does not help more in these countries.
(2) Helliwell, J. (2016). Life satisfaction and quality of development. In Bartolini, S., Bilancini, E., Bruni, L., and Porta, P., editors, Policies for Happiness, chapter 7, page 149. Oxford University Press.
There should be others too. For partial explanations (off the top of my head), think income inequality, quality of jobs (security), corruption, work hours, and materialism.
Vadim, discussing with you will cause me to be more explicit about the time involved in future writing. Thank you. As I first argued, 71 years is a long time, which cross-sectional results do not consider. I respond more completely below.
“Yes, I am definitely talking about WELLBYs. I meant to say that there are two ways of looking at both income and SWB, a level at a point in time, and the sum of the levels per year (we can think of those as the area under the curve plotted across time). We can call the summed versions INCYs and WELLBYs, and the point in time estimates Income and SWB. So I think in year 13.5, we can say that we get .2 WELLBYs for 1 INCY. Or alternatively, we can say that we get .027 SWBs for 14% Income gain. I don’t think that we should be comparing SWBs (a point in time estimate) to INCYs (a summation estimate).”
Response I agree with part, in year 13.5 we get .2 WELLBYs for 1 INCY (when INCY equals an income doubling),
and adjusted this statement slightly, 0.027 SWB points for a 14% increase in growth for one year.
However, a 14% increase in growth is rarely observed and never sustained. .002 does not apply to such changes.
“To illustrate I’ll try to go back to the example of boosting Ethiopia’s growth by 1pp, using your coefficient of 0.002. For simplicity, let’s say that Ethiopia starts with a per capita GDP of $1000, a SWB of 4, and a real growth rate of 0%. It seems like we agree that “The population in year 13.5 reports .027 greater SWB points after an increase in growth by one percent.” So if we boost growth to 1% I think we agree that in year 71 Ethiopia would have a per capita GDP of $2000 (versus the counterfactual $1000) and a SWB = 4 + 71*.002=4.14.”
Agreed
“Now to address our discussion on (3) in the below thread, you say: “As you point out, our results include larger coefficient estimates using different specifications, yet we still argue they are not economically significant,” and then in response to my comment that “those coefficients seem to be close to what we would expect from the cross-sectional data,” you comment “I don’t agree that the results are similar in size.”
Let’s assume we accept the coefficient from your regression in table 3, column 5: 0.007. That would imply that in year 71 Ethiopia would have roughly twice the GDP than it would have had counterfactually (compared to the 0% growth world), and a SWB = 4+71*.007 = 4.5. This is 0.5 points higher than the counterfactual.”
Agreed with the math, however, the coefficient is wrong. You should add the negative coefficient on the interaction term to get the correct relationship 0.007 − 0.005. The largest relationship applies in the transition countries 0.007 + 0.003, but as argued in the paper, they are exceptional cases. And, the WVS/EVS results show smaller coefficients.
“Now let’s imagine that in the cross section regression Ethiopia and country X are both exactly on our regression line. Ethiopia is at $1000 and SWB of 4, country X is at $2000 and SWP of 4.5 (That is roughly where the cross sectional regression lines fall as I argue in my post, and as you can see from the graph I include). If there were no Easterlin Paradox, we would expect that if Ethiopia gradually got to $2000 GDP, it would move up the regression line to where country X currently is. But it seems like that is exactly what the .007 regression coefficient implies in the preceding paragraph? If so, is this at odds with your response on discussion (3) in the below thread?”
Although the math is correct (assuming 0.007), it took 71 years to achieve the change in SWB, whereas the cross-sectional results do not consider the time involved. As mentioned before 71 years is greater than life expectancy in many countries, and as the WVS/EVS results show, the coefficients are smaller in longer time series.
The coefficient estimates of .002 or .007 apply to long-run sustained growth after accounting for adaptation and social comparison. If you were to double the income of Ethiopians in one year, neither coefficient would apply. We are not sure what applies. Short run growth typically has a larger relationship, the effect of which diminishes over time, possibly to zero, and the benefits of cash transfers do not accrue to the population as a whole.
I don’t think you want to apply our results to what you’re evaluating, especially considering we are talking about the Gallup results and ignoring the EVS/WVS results. They are preferred for long-run periods (still fare less than 71 years) and they reveal smaller, even negative growth relations.
We should be looking at long run outcomes of interventions and then assessing them at scale. It’s possible that many people on the lower end of the income distribution benefit greatly – indeed many economists, even happiness ones, believe this in their bones. We just need more evidence at scale.
“Alternatively, don’t the coefficients from Sacks, Stevenson, and Wolfers 2012 roughly correspond to the larger coefficient estimates in your regressions (since both include 10 year short-term fluctuations)? So if Sacks et. al. convincingly reran their analysis to focus on the same countries and longer time series that you use, and got the same coefficients they did in their paper, would that not update us towards thinking that longitudinal and cross-sectional results might be similar?”
Honestly, I haven’t read the SSW paper in quite some time, in part because of what you reference here, they shorten the length of the time-series and also because they leave out data that was available to them at the time.
My disagreement about the TS and CS studies is the time involved as mentioned above. The CS studies make it seem like we could magically double income and ignore the time involved. Even if the coefficients are the same, the implications are not. Discussing with you brought this to my attention, and I will discuss it more explicitly in future writing.
“I think we could also use a similar argument about the Ethiopian counterfactual SWB = 4 + 71*.002=4.14 to argue that it matches the cash transfer results that I cite in my post.”
See discussion above about time. I simply don’t think my results apply to what you’re assessing.
If I understand correctly, it sounds like we now agree on the math of my post, and on my arguments around which coefficients from cross-sectional vs longitudinal regressions seem to match? But I think we still disagree about whether the impacts of a gradual increase in gdp across time should be compared to cross-sectional differences?
My first thought on our disagreement is that an income doubling is a fairly arbitrary metric. I think it would be equally reasonable to zoom in on the cross sectional graph, and look at the impact of a 1% increase in income. We can imagine country Y on the cross-section graph which lies a little higher than Ethiopia on the regression line in my post. This country would have $1010 per capital GDP and a SWB of 4+1*.007=4.007, versus Ethiopia at $1000 and 4. If we compare this to what we would expect from a .007 coefficient in one of your alternative regressions, it looks like it’s exactly what we would expect from one year of 1% growth vs the counterfactual for Ethiopia? In this case we don’t need to worry about the amount of time it takes to double income, and TS and CS become more intuitively comparable?
My second thought is that if we assume that TS results are not comparable to CS results because they take a long time, wouldn’t that make the existence of the Easterlin Paradox irrelevant for making any judgements about the world? Isn’t the Easterlin Paradox a paradox precisely because we expect the coefficients to match between CS and TS, but they don’t seem to in some specifications?
“we are talking about the Gallup results and ignoring the EVS/WVS results. They are preferred for long-run periods.”
Agreed. I haven’t looked at the EVS/WVS results at all, so there is a good chance that they are less sensitive to the kinds of alternative specifications I tried for the Gallup results.
“It’s possible that many people on the lower end of the income distribution benefit greatly – indeed many economists, even happiness ones, believe this in their bones. We just need more evidence at scale.”
I share the same intuition, and find this an interesting area for further exploration. I would be curious to hear your thoughts on why the “Growth X LDC” coefficients in all of your regressions are negative (which is a surprise to me). This seems to imply that people lower down the income distribution are actually benefiting less from % income increases? Re-running your regressions on just the less-developed countries in your Gallup dataset, I also get smaller coefficients than those for the whole dataset.
“If I understand correctly, it sounds like we now agree on the math of my post, and on my arguments around which coefficients from cross-sectional vs longitudinal regressions seem to match? But I think we still disagree about whether the impacts of a gradual increase in gdp across time should be compared to cross-sectional differences?”
Response: Not quite, I agree with some of the calculations you did in the last post, but not with the overall post and conclusions. The quickest justification for this response is that the EVS/WVS coefficients are smaller and even negative for certain country groups. There’s also the statistical significance to consider, which we have not discussed. There is a large amount of uncertainty in the estimates, and while they could be larger, they could also be zero. But regardless of coefficient, yes, we disagree about the implications of time-series (TS) and cross-sectional (CS) differences.
“My first thought on our disagreement is that an income doubling is a fairly arbitrary metric. I think it would be equally reasonable to zoom in on the cross sectional graph, and look at the impact of a 1% increase in income. We can imagine country Y on the cross-section graph which lies a little higher than Ethiopia on the regression line in my post. This country would have $1010 per capital GDP and a SWB of 4+1*.007=4.007, versus Ethiopia at $1000 and 4. If we compare this to what we would expect from a .007 coefficient in one of your alternative regressions, it looks like it’s exactly what we would expect from one year of 1% growth vs the counterfactual for Ethiopia? In this case we don’t need to worry about the amount of time it takes to double income, and TS and CS become more intuitively comparable?”
Response: You’re right that in that case we do not need to worry about the time involved, but what you’re pointing out is how small the relationship actually is in the cross-section. From the figure, the cross-sectional relationship is: y = −2.955 + 0.342*ln(x). Then a 1 percent increase in income is related to an increase in SWB of approximately 0.342*0.01 = 0.003, which of course is actually smaller than the 0.007 coefficient (note the previous post, 0.007 applies to developed not less developed countries. Also, it is statistically insignificant and could also be zero).
“My second thought is that if we assume that TS results are not comparable to CS results because they take a long time, wouldn’t that make the existence of the Easterlin Paradox irrelevant for making any judgements about the world? Isn’t the Easterlin Paradox a paradox precisely because we expect the coefficients to match between CS and TS, but they don’t seem to in some specifications?”
Response: You’re right that the Paradox is about the contrast between the two types of results. However, it’s not just whether the coefficients match. The CS results are statistically significant and the TS results are generally not statistically significant. A second aspect is that the TS results, even if statistically significant, make it clear how long it would take for SWB to increase. The period necessary is not clear in CS results, which makes it look like the CS results are much larger than the TS results. Your calculation above suggests that the CS results are actually quite small too, or that we need larger changes in income to have meaningful changes in SWB, which as the TS results point out, will take a long time. Another aspect, the Paradox is about the contrast, but the surprising result is how small the TS relation is. Whether there’s a contrast or not, this relation is important for thinking about the world.
“we are talking about the Gallup results and ignoring the EVS/WVS results. They are preferred for long-run periods.”
Agreed. I haven’t looked at the EVS/WVS results at all, so there is a good chance that they are less sensitive to the kinds of alternative specifications I tried for the Gallup results.”
Response: the sensitivity isn’t too important, because the relationships are all small. As stated above, even the CS results are quite small, or we need larger changes in income to have meaningful changes in SWB, which as the TS results point out, will take a long time.
“It’s possible that many people on the lower end of the income distribution benefit greatly – indeed many economists, even happiness ones, believe this in their bones. We just need more evidence at scale.”
“I share the same intuition, and find this an interesting area for further exploration. I would be curious to hear your thoughts on why the “Growth X LDC” coefficients in all of your regressions are negative (which is a surprise to me). This seems to imply that people lower down the income distribution are actually benefiting less from % income increases? Re-running your regressions on just the less-developed countries in your Gallup dataset, I also get smaller coefficients than those for the whole dataset.”
Response: The Growth X LDC coefficient applies to lower income countries not strictly lower income people. The distinction is important because we can expect the mechanisms to be different. The impacts of income within a country are absolute and relative, due to social comparison as well as cost of living. Recall that poverty is usually defined in relative terms, i.e., as 60% of the median. While at the country level, I expect income to operate more in absolute terms. It’s not clear to me why growth does not help more in these countries.
What I can suggest are two papers that discuss the quality of growth: (1) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X17300049
(2) Helliwell, J. (2016). Life satisfaction and quality of development. In Bartolini, S., Bilancini, E., Bruni, L., and Porta, P., editors, Policies for Happiness, chapter 7, page 149. Oxford University Press.
There should be others too. For partial explanations (off the top of my head), think income inequality, quality of jobs (security), corruption, work hours, and materialism.