Late to seeing this, but it reminded me of the military debate over Effects Based Operations.
EBO holds that the effects of an action are more important than the action itself. This idea became prominent after the 1991 Gulf War, where the Air Force surgically destroyed Iraqi defenses by targeting key nodes and creating big second and third-order effects.
EBO enjoyed a decade or two of prominence, before the reality that most follow-on effects are hard to predict set in. The Gulf War involved targeting a closed and well understood system, where input X reliably created outputs Y and Z. Most environments aren’t like that...especially developing world chicken farms.
Today the military mostly relies on creating immediate first-order effects, rather than trying to predict the kind of amusing cascade you highlighted!
Late to seeing this, but it reminded me of the military debate over Effects Based Operations.
EBO holds that the effects of an action are more important than the action itself. This idea became prominent after the 1991 Gulf War, where the Air Force surgically destroyed Iraqi defenses by targeting key nodes and creating big second and third-order effects.
EBO enjoyed a decade or two of prominence, before the reality that most follow-on effects are hard to predict set in. The Gulf War involved targeting a closed and well understood system, where input X reliably created outputs Y and Z. Most environments aren’t like that...especially developing world chicken farms.
Today the military mostly relies on creating immediate first-order effects, rather than trying to predict the kind of amusing cascade you highlighted!