Executive summary: The author argues that when a moral or philosophical claim would have enormous implications if true—such as veganism, global poverty alleviation, or especially longtermism—then one must be extremely certain it’s false before disregarding it; given the astronomical stakes of the far future, even small probabilities that longtermism is correct make it overwhelmingly important to act on.
Key points:
Many moral arguments, like those for veganism or charity, have “astronomical stakes”—if true, they imply immense moral consequences, so dismissing them requires near-certainty of their falsity.
A modest probability that such claims are correct still gives them high expected moral weight, since expected value scales with both impact and probability.
Applied to longtermism: because the potential value (or suffering) in the far future dwarfs present considerations, even a small chance of affecting it ethically dominates other priorities.
Common objections—like doubts that we can influence the future or that creating happy lives matters—don’t meet the evidential threshold needed to negate longtermism’s importance.
The author concludes that rational agents should treat longtermist actions (e.g. reducing existential risk or improving the long-term trajectory of civilization) as ethically urgent, since the expected value remains extraordinary even amid uncertainty.
More broadly, people’s failure to take seriously arguments with massive stakes—merely because they seem extreme or socially inconvenient—represents a widespread moral error.
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Executive summary: The author argues that when a moral or philosophical claim would have enormous implications if true—such as veganism, global poverty alleviation, or especially longtermism—then one must be extremely certain it’s false before disregarding it; given the astronomical stakes of the far future, even small probabilities that longtermism is correct make it overwhelmingly important to act on.
Key points:
Many moral arguments, like those for veganism or charity, have “astronomical stakes”—if true, they imply immense moral consequences, so dismissing them requires near-certainty of their falsity.
A modest probability that such claims are correct still gives them high expected moral weight, since expected value scales with both impact and probability.
Applied to longtermism: because the potential value (or suffering) in the far future dwarfs present considerations, even a small chance of affecting it ethically dominates other priorities.
Common objections—like doubts that we can influence the future or that creating happy lives matters—don’t meet the evidential threshold needed to negate longtermism’s importance.
The author concludes that rational agents should treat longtermist actions (e.g. reducing existential risk or improving the long-term trajectory of civilization) as ethically urgent, since the expected value remains extraordinary even amid uncertainty.
More broadly, people’s failure to take seriously arguments with massive stakes—merely because they seem extreme or socially inconvenient—represents a widespread moral error.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.