Norwood says he did take slaughter into account, but that he didn’t think it affected animal welfare much relative to other factors. See his discussion with Simon Knutsson:
FWIW, if I had a choice whether to live as a broiler chicken and be slaughtered after 42 days or not exist at all, I think I’d prefer not to exist at all. OTOH, I think I’d prefer to live 2 years or so as a beef cow and then be slaughtered rather than not exist at all. So I feel a lot more comfortable eating beef than chicken. But I’m not completely comfortable because I’m not fully confident in this preference, and because I think “animal rights” arguments have some merit independent of utilitarian considerations.
Great conversation! I hadn’t seen that yet. Simon doesn’t ask about slaughter in the case of chickens again, unfortunately, because it seems like Bailey replied with other animals in mind than chickens farmed for meat. But his reply with regard to transport probably transfers to slaughter: “Yes, I did take into account the number of times they were transported relatively to their lifespan. It is hard for me to say exactly how much it influenced the scores, because they are just my judgment calls, but it is something I tried to account for, and something I definitely thought of.”
I thought I had read something to the effect that he didn’t factor in slaughter in the book itself, but I can’t find it anymore. What I may be remembering is Bailey’s comment on Brain’s old blog: “I do not make any adjustments for the length of the life for any animal. I did at first, but I found the difficulties and ambiguities unsatisfying.” I understood this as meaning that the chickens would receive the same score even if they lived for years, but Bailey may’ve meant something else.
And agreed. When I consider what life I would prefer to not living, I arrive at similar results, with considerably less uncertainty about my preference in the first than in the second case.
“I think ‘animal rights’ arguments have some merit independent of utilitarian considerations”: I tend to consider those from a two-level utilitarian perspective. For example, a society that is alert to speciesism will also be better equipped to avoid discrimination of sentient algorithms, what I’ve heard called substratism. Hard and fast, broad and imperfect principles can make it easier for many people to see violations.
Then consistency is also important to me, so when I’m comfortable with beef I also ought to be comfortable with a company serving a cannibal customer base by raising children in isolation, providing them with most things they desire including libraries for intellectual stimulation and so on, and then harvesting them at age 16–20 or so for their meat. I don’t think I would be entirely comfortable with that and rather prefer such a company to not exist, maybe because of the years of life stolen from them which to keep they already formed a preference. Not sure.
Norwood says he did take slaughter into account, but that he didn’t think it affected animal welfare much relative to other factors. See his discussion with Simon Knutsson:
http://simonknutsson.com/files/exchange-bailey-norwood-2013-07-29-for-publication.docx
FWIW, if I had a choice whether to live as a broiler chicken and be slaughtered after 42 days or not exist at all, I think I’d prefer not to exist at all. OTOH, I think I’d prefer to live 2 years or so as a beef cow and then be slaughtered rather than not exist at all. So I feel a lot more comfortable eating beef than chicken. But I’m not completely comfortable because I’m not fully confident in this preference, and because I think “animal rights” arguments have some merit independent of utilitarian considerations.
Avi
Great conversation! I hadn’t seen that yet. Simon doesn’t ask about slaughter in the case of chickens again, unfortunately, because it seems like Bailey replied with other animals in mind than chickens farmed for meat. But his reply with regard to transport probably transfers to slaughter: “Yes, I did take into account the number of times they were transported relatively to their lifespan. It is hard for me to say exactly how much it influenced the scores, because they are just my judgment calls, but it is something I tried to account for, and something I definitely thought of.”
I thought I had read something to the effect that he didn’t factor in slaughter in the book itself, but I can’t find it anymore. What I may be remembering is Bailey’s comment on Brain’s old blog: “I do not make any adjustments for the length of the life for any animal. I did at first, but I found the difficulties and ambiguities unsatisfying.” I understood this as meaning that the chickens would receive the same score even if they lived for years, but Bailey may’ve meant something else.
And agreed. When I consider what life I would prefer to not living, I arrive at similar results, with considerably less uncertainty about my preference in the first than in the second case.
“I think ‘animal rights’ arguments have some merit independent of utilitarian considerations”: I tend to consider those from a two-level utilitarian perspective. For example, a society that is alert to speciesism will also be better equipped to avoid discrimination of sentient algorithms, what I’ve heard called substratism. Hard and fast, broad and imperfect principles can make it easier for many people to see violations.
Then consistency is also important to me, so when I’m comfortable with beef I also ought to be comfortable with a company serving a cannibal customer base by raising children in isolation, providing them with most things they desire including libraries for intellectual stimulation and so on, and then harvesting them at age 16–20 or so for their meat. I don’t think I would be entirely comfortable with that and rather prefer such a company to not exist, maybe because of the years of life stolen from them which to keep they already formed a preference. Not sure.