I think there’s a pluralism of values here where the value of GHD doesn’t hinge just on it’s AW effects, i.e. we value it as a cause priority on its own. The point there was meant to be something more like “GHD looks good, but I also care about animals, so how do I decide what to do given the meat-eater problem? Well, it seems like the meat-eater problem might plausibly be canceled out by effects on WAW (more people taking up more space), so when you’re trying to decide the sign of the effect of GHD on AW it seems reasonable to conclude uncertainty.”
Effects on AW are an important consideration for GHD but they’re not the only or most important factor going into the overall positivity of the cause. Does that make sense?
Effects on AW are an important consideration for GHD but they’re not the only or most important factor going into the overall positivity of the cause. Does that make sense?
It sounds like this is actually the core crux of your view, then. If so, it might be worth making that explicit in the post. As it stands, the discussion of WAW could give the impression that it plays a more decisive role in your evaluation than it ultimately does, whereas your judgment seems to rest mainly on the effects on human welfare, given what you say here.
I also think this position of yours (that is now revealed) invites further scrutiny. Given how many more animals are plausibly affected by GDH compared to humans, concluding that AW is not the most important factor appears to rely on specific assumptions about moral weights that privilege humans to an extent that would be very controversial if it were made explicit. It could be helpful to spell those assumptions out, or at least acknowledge that they’re doing significant work here.
I’m interested in how you make your donation (or prioritization) decisions between causes? I think I might have more grounding for the debate understanding that, but continuing on with this thread...
I think that this maybe doesn’t take into account some of the arguments we have in the moral diversity section (and also the idea above of moral seriousness). The sort of reasoning you outline is this more totalizing utilitarian consideration where all of your donating is lead by some key factors (i.e. moral weights, the expected size of the future, etc.).
We’re getting at something different in the section you’re pulling from (namely that indirect effects are really important and should be considered) but in this other one we’re saying “Maybe consider splitting your allocation across different groups rather than just letting one utility function dominate it all”. GHD is something like a “helping humans now” bucket for me that I never want to fully ignore because I think that’s important.
I think there’s a pluralism of values here where the value of GHD doesn’t hinge just on it’s AW effects, i.e. we value it as a cause priority on its own. The point there was meant to be something more like “GHD looks good, but I also care about animals, so how do I decide what to do given the meat-eater problem? Well, it seems like the meat-eater problem might plausibly be canceled out by effects on WAW (more people taking up more space), so when you’re trying to decide the sign of the effect of GHD on AW it seems reasonable to conclude uncertainty.”
Effects on AW are an important consideration for GHD but they’re not the only or most important factor going into the overall positivity of the cause. Does that make sense?
Nice, thanks for engaging! :)
It sounds like this is actually the core crux of your view, then. If so, it might be worth making that explicit in the post. As it stands, the discussion of WAW could give the impression that it plays a more decisive role in your evaluation than it ultimately does, whereas your judgment seems to rest mainly on the effects on human welfare, given what you say here.
I also think this position of yours (that is now revealed) invites further scrutiny. Given how many more animals are plausibly affected by GDH compared to humans, concluding that AW is not the most important factor appears to rely on specific assumptions about moral weights that privilege humans to an extent that would be very controversial if it were made explicit. It could be helpful to spell those assumptions out, or at least acknowledge that they’re doing significant work here.
Absolutely! And sorry for the lag.
I’m interested in how you make your donation (or prioritization) decisions between causes? I think I might have more grounding for the debate understanding that, but continuing on with this thread...
I think that this maybe doesn’t take into account some of the arguments we have in the moral diversity section (and also the idea above of moral seriousness). The sort of reasoning you outline is this more totalizing utilitarian consideration where all of your donating is lead by some key factors (i.e. moral weights, the expected size of the future, etc.).
We’re getting at something different in the section you’re pulling from (namely that indirect effects are really important and should be considered) but in this other one we’re saying “Maybe consider splitting your allocation across different groups rather than just letting one utility function dominate it all”. GHD is something like a “helping humans now” bucket for me that I never want to fully ignore because I think that’s important.