I understand your concern and anticipated this. I had a reply in the text at the end, and I made a longer version as well. Here is the longer reply to that particular concern:
Possible concerns and replies Isn’t it immoral to substitute chicken and fish suffering with cow suffering?
It is not definite that this intervention will in fact create more cow suffering. As explained above, most efficiency interventions do not harm cow welfare, on the contrary increase it. The use of high yielding breeds can also result in a smaller number of total dairy animals.
But even if one concedes that this intervention will create more suffering on at least some individual cows, one has to see that every action and intervention creates some side effects and one can only solve these dilemmas by a utility calculus most of the time. For example, if one adopts a vegan diet or promotes alternative proteins, some mice in a new legume farm may also be killed at the end of the day due to industrial agriculture. It could have survived if additional demand for that plant-based food was not present. Of course, one can respond by saying that a vegan diet or a plant protein source would decrease thetotal animal deaths and suffering by removing more animals from the supply chain. That is correct. And the same logic applies here as well. If closing the dairy gap in those regions creates some suffering for some animals but mitigates the total animal suffering, then it can also be deemed moral.
Animal welfare reforms also work similarly. Thanks to new broiler welfare standards new breeds are now used in the chicken meat industry. By these policies, animal advocates aim to substitute fast growing breeds (for example Cobb-500, Ross-308) with slower growing breeds (for example Hubbard JA757 or Norfolk Black). These are different animals. By implementing welfare reforms, we do not improve the welfare of existing animals who suffer, we substitute animals who will suffer more with ones who will suffer less in the future. But these interventions eventually result in Hubbard JA757 (high welfare breeds) suffering and death. We deem that moral because we can’t save all of them and without the intervention there would be more Cobb-500 suffering and death, and more total animal suffering. If one agrees that substituting the suffering of one breed of an animal (Cobb-500 broiler chicken) with the suffering of another breed of an animal (Hubbard JA757 broiler chicken) is acceptable if it decreases total suffering, then substituting the suffering of one specie (chicken or fish) with the suffering of another specie (cow) should also be acceptable if it decreases total suffering.
Hello! Thank you for the comment.
I understand your concern and anticipated this. I had a reply in the text at the end, and I made a longer version as well. Here is the longer reply to that particular concern:
Possible concerns and replies
Isn’t it immoral to substitute chicken and fish suffering with cow suffering?
It is not definite that this intervention will in fact create more cow suffering. As explained above, most efficiency interventions do not harm cow welfare, on the contrary increase it. The use of high yielding breeds can also result in a smaller number of total dairy animals.
But even if one concedes that this intervention will create more suffering on at least some individual cows, one has to see that every action and intervention creates some side effects and one can only solve these dilemmas by a utility calculus most of the time. For example, if one adopts a vegan diet or promotes alternative proteins, some mice in a new legume farm may also be killed at the end of the day due to industrial agriculture. It could have survived if additional demand for that plant-based food was not present. Of course, one can respond by saying that a vegan diet or a plant protein source would decrease the total animal deaths and suffering by removing more animals from the supply chain. That is correct. And the same logic applies here as well. If closing the dairy gap in those regions creates some suffering for some animals but mitigates the total animal suffering, then it can also be deemed moral.
Animal welfare reforms also work similarly. Thanks to new broiler welfare standards new breeds are now used in the chicken meat industry. By these policies, animal advocates aim to substitute fast growing breeds (for example Cobb-500, Ross-308) with slower growing breeds (for example Hubbard JA757 or Norfolk Black). These are different animals. By implementing welfare reforms, we do not improve the welfare of existing animals who suffer, we substitute animals who will suffer more with ones who will suffer less in the future. But these interventions eventually result in Hubbard JA757 (high welfare breeds) suffering and death. We deem that moral because we can’t save all of them and without the intervention there would be more Cobb-500 suffering and death, and more total animal suffering. If one agrees that substituting the suffering of one breed of an animal (Cobb-500 broiler chicken) with the suffering of another breed of an animal (Hubbard JA757 broiler chicken) is acceptable if it decreases total suffering, then substituting the suffering of one specie (chicken or fish) with the suffering of another specie (cow) should also be acceptable if it decreases total suffering.