Thank you, Seth, for a great piece. I have devoted most of my 30year-odd career to nuclear diplomacy, deterrence and acquisition policies. What I have consciously steered clear of up until now has been scenarios for nuclear use, de-escalation strategies, forecasting, consequences and resilience. This whole experience has had me wondering whether my focus at CSER would benefit from that focus, and what that would look like in research, analysis and efforts to impact. I’m thinking that in the short term we need to look at escalation scenarios, de-escalation options at each stage (off-ramps) for both sides, as well as the consequences of limited or less than limited nuclear exchange.
If you’re looking for co-conspirators on your second line of work, Seth, I’d be very keen to talk further. I do think this situation has to be seen as an opportunity, a point of inflexion, to bring attention to some of the dangerous postures all nuclear weapon states engage in.
Thank you, Seth, for a great piece. I have devoted most of my 30year-odd career to nuclear diplomacy, deterrence and acquisition policies. What I have consciously steered clear of up until now has been scenarios for nuclear use, de-escalation strategies, forecasting, consequences and resilience. This whole experience has had me wondering whether my focus at CSER would benefit from that focus, and what that would look like in research, analysis and efforts to impact. I’m thinking that in the short term we need to look at escalation scenarios, de-escalation options at each stage (off-ramps) for both sides, as well as the consequences of limited or less than limited nuclear exchange.
If you’re looking for co-conspirators on your second line of work, Seth, I’d be very keen to talk further. I do think this situation has to be seen as an opportunity, a point of inflexion, to bring attention to some of the dangerous postures all nuclear weapon states engage in.
Paul Ingram, CSER