Population dynamics suggest that a near-existential catastrophe would introduce existential risks and threats to long-term value that were previously not considered. Hence we should update the value of preventing near-existential catastrophes.
Could you elaborate? In my mind, catastrophes leading to over 90 % of the population dying flow through AI and bio risk, which are the 2 longtermist priorities, so I am not sure which “threats to long-term value that were previously not considered” you have in mind.
There is no guarantee that such a preindustrial society would be able to rekindle advanced civilization (Mokyr, 2016), especially with disadvantages such as an altered climate and depleted fossil fuel deposits (Dartnell, 2015) and so eventual extinction seems to be a likely outcome.
Do you have any thoughts on the chance of 90 % of the population dying leading to preindustrial society? That may happen in some places, but presumably not everywhere. It also depends on the type of catastrophe. In some AI and nanotech catastrophes, there may even be more industry after the death of 90 % of the human population.
In summary, for a post-catastrophe world to recover through slow growth would entail a long, risky period of recovery.
A relevant factor here is how the catastrophe would influence the risks from the development of transformative AI, pandemics, nuclear war, great power conflict, and climate change. Looking into how the development of transformative AI would change seems especially relevant, as I would expect a 90 % human population loss to be facilitated by the misuse of AI (e.g. to engineer a pandemic, or a mega cyber attack).
It seems almost obvious that fertility culture is “sticky” over time. We see it in rapidly developing countries, when the fertility rate begins to drop many years after improvements to quality of life begin to reduce mortality rates. Similarly, we can expect low-fertility culture to be “sticky” after a catastrophe: suppose you are a typical young woman in a wealthy country, who plans to have only 1-2 children. If a terrible catastrophe thrusts society into a pre-industrial state, you won’t suddenly want to have 5 children. Any increases in fertility are likely to be moderate and, if contraceptive access is restored quickly, short-lived.
You may want to look into historical examples of fertility increasing after catastrophes, like after the Black Death.
These are not necessarily bad values, but
Not sure whether you wanted to have something after “but”.
Could you elaborate? In my mind, catastrophes leading to over 90 % of the population dying flow through AI and bio risk, which are the 2 longtermist priorities, so I am not sure which “threats to long-term value that were previously not considered” you have in mind.
I’d say that “succumbing to long-term demographic decline after a major catastrophe” is the threat that has not previously been considered. People might assume that if hundreds of millions of people survive a catastrophe and begin reindustrializing, the main existential problem is that they are more vulnerable to the next catastrophe. I think population decline is an extra worry, and so the existential consequences of a global catastrophe are slightly greater.
Do you have any thoughts on the chance of 90 % of the population dying leading to preindustrial society?
I don’t think I have many useful insights here, except that we have very limited historical data to rely upon. It’s possible that even 10% mortality could trigger ripple effects that bring everything crashing down. If the cause of mortality was a global agricultural shortfall, we might see governments become very protectionist, banning food exports, which in turn leads to sanctions on other goods. If global trade shuts down, who knows what will happen...
It’s possible that industrialization could persist in one place, but it would be difficult as no one country has all of the resources that we use globally today. The islands that would be most resilient to climate changes in a nuclear winter would struggle from lack of energy sources and other things. The US seems to be well-endowed with resources, but still lacks some important metals. Rich economies are dependent upon cheap labour from abroad, through imports and immigration. So I’d say regional industrialization is possible but uncertain.
You may want to look into historical examples of fertility increasing after catastrophes, like after the Black Death.
Yes! In my first draft I looked at the Black Death, China’s Great Leap Forward Famine, and the Irish Famine. The population collapse in the Americas after the arrival of Europeans could be useful too, although nobody really knows how many people died.
It’s worth pointing out that these catastrophes happened in places that had not yet had a demographic transition—so they may be a good test of Malthusian models, but they don’t really help us with what would happen to a mature society.
It took a long time for Europe to recover from the Black Death, partly because the plague kept coming back. But once the plague was gone, growth may have been faster than pre-catastrophe. Perhaps there were more resources available per person, and better tech to exploit them with. To me that would be sign that mediaeval demographics were somewhat Malthusian.
The Irish Famine is tricky because more people emigrated than starved, and the famine was the beginning of a long demographic decline for the country. I couldn’t find any evidence of skyrocketing birth rates.
Although China’s famine was the biggest ever, it was still only a few % of China’s population. It’s difficult to tell amid the noise amid whether/how the famine altered China’s long-term population trajectory. We know that fertility dropped during the famine and spiked afterwards (maybe partly due to people “replacing” lost babies/pregnancies). But a few years later, China resumed the fertility decline that had begun soon before the famine. The fertility rate dropped from 5.7 to 2.8 between 1970 and 1980.
I’d be interested to hear of any historical examples that might be useful!
Nice report, Stan!
Could you elaborate? In my mind, catastrophes leading to over 90 % of the population dying flow through AI and bio risk, which are the 2 longtermist priorities, so I am not sure which “threats to long-term value that were previously not considered” you have in mind.
Do you have any thoughts on the chance of 90 % of the population dying leading to preindustrial society? That may happen in some places, but presumably not everywhere. It also depends on the type of catastrophe. In some AI and nanotech catastrophes, there may even be more industry after the death of 90 % of the human population.
A relevant factor here is how the catastrophe would influence the risks from the development of transformative AI, pandemics, nuclear war, great power conflict, and climate change. Looking into how the development of transformative AI would change seems especially relevant, as I would expect a 90 % human population loss to be facilitated by the misuse of AI (e.g. to engineer a pandemic, or a mega cyber attack).
You may want to look into historical examples of fertility increasing after catastrophes, like after the Black Death.
Not sure whether you wanted to have something after “but”.
I’d say that “succumbing to long-term demographic decline after a major catastrophe” is the threat that has not previously been considered. People might assume that if hundreds of millions of people survive a catastrophe and begin reindustrializing, the main existential problem is that they are more vulnerable to the next catastrophe. I think population decline is an extra worry, and so the existential consequences of a global catastrophe are slightly greater.
I don’t think I have many useful insights here, except that we have very limited historical data to rely upon. It’s possible that even 10% mortality could trigger ripple effects that bring everything crashing down. If the cause of mortality was a global agricultural shortfall, we might see governments become very protectionist, banning food exports, which in turn leads to sanctions on other goods. If global trade shuts down, who knows what will happen...
It’s possible that industrialization could persist in one place, but it would be difficult as no one country has all of the resources that we use globally today. The islands that would be most resilient to climate changes in a nuclear winter would struggle from lack of energy sources and other things. The US seems to be well-endowed with resources, but still lacks some important metals. Rich economies are dependent upon cheap labour from abroad, through imports and immigration. So I’d say regional industrialization is possible but uncertain.
Yes! In my first draft I looked at the Black Death, China’s Great Leap Forward Famine, and the Irish Famine. The population collapse in the Americas after the arrival of Europeans could be useful too, although nobody really knows how many people died.
It’s worth pointing out that these catastrophes happened in places that had not yet had a demographic transition—so they may be a good test of Malthusian models, but they don’t really help us with what would happen to a mature society.
It took a long time for Europe to recover from the Black Death, partly because the plague kept coming back. But once the plague was gone, growth may have been faster than pre-catastrophe. Perhaps there were more resources available per person, and better tech to exploit them with. To me that would be sign that mediaeval demographics were somewhat Malthusian.
The Irish Famine is tricky because more people emigrated than starved, and the famine was the beginning of a long demographic decline for the country. I couldn’t find any evidence of skyrocketing birth rates.
Although China’s famine was the biggest ever, it was still only a few % of China’s population. It’s difficult to tell amid the noise amid whether/how the famine altered China’s long-term population trajectory. We know that fertility dropped during the famine and spiked afterwards (maybe partly due to people “replacing” lost babies/pregnancies). But a few years later, China resumed the fertility decline that had begun soon before the famine. The fertility rate dropped from 5.7 to 2.8 between 1970 and 1980.
I’d be interested to hear of any historical examples that might be useful!
Thanks for the comprehensive reply!
Thanks for the comment!
I’ll give a full response tomorrow.
[I didn’t mean to end the sentence with “but”—thanks for pointing that out, I have now fixed it.]