2min coherent view there: the likely flowthrough of not saving a child right in front of you to your psychological wellbeing, community, and future social functioning, especially compared to the counterfactual, are drastically worse than not donating enough to save two children on average, and the powerful intuition one could expect to feel in such a situation, saying that you should save the child, is so strong that to numb or ignore it is likely to damage the strength of that moral intuition or compass, which could be wildly imprudent. In essence:
-psychological and flow-through effects of helping those in proximity to you are likely undervalued in extreme situations where you are the only one capable of mitigating the problem
-effects of community flow-through effects in developed countries regarding altruistic social acts in general may be undervalued, especially if they uniquely foster one’s own well-being or moral character through exercise of a “moral muscle”
-it is imprudent to ignore strong moral intuition, especially in emergency scenarios, and it is important to Make a Habit of not ignoring strong intuition (unless further reflection leads to the natural modification/dissipation of that intuition)
To me, naive application of utilitarianism often leads to underestimating these considerations.
There was meant to be an “all else equal” clause in there (as usually goes without saying in these sorts of thought experiments) -- otherwise, as you say, the verdict wouldn’t necessarily indicate underlying non-utilitarian concerns at all.
Perhaps easiest to imagine if you modify the thought experiment so that your psychology (memories, “moral muscles”, etc.) will be “reset” after making the decision. I’m talking about those who would insist that you still ought to save the one over the two even then—no matter how the purely utilitarian considerations play out.
Yeah honestly I don’t think there is a single true deontologist on Earth. To say anything is good or addresses the good, including deontology, one must define the “good” aimed at.
I think personal/direct situations entail a slew of complicating factors that a utilitarian should consider. As a response to that uncertainty, it is often rational to lean on intuition. And, thus, it is bad to undermine that intuition habitually.
“Directness” inherently means higher level of physical/emotional involvement, different (likely closer to home) social landscape and stakes, etc. So constructing an “all else being equal” scenario is impossible.
Related to initial deontologist point: when your average person expresses a “directness matters” view, it is very likely they are expressing concern for these considerations, rather than actually having a diehard deontologist view (even if they use language that suggests that).
2min coherent view there: the likely flowthrough of not saving a child right in front of you to your psychological wellbeing, community, and future social functioning, especially compared to the counterfactual, are drastically worse than not donating enough to save two children on average, and the powerful intuition one could expect to feel in such a situation, saying that you should save the child, is so strong that to numb or ignore it is likely to damage the strength of that moral intuition or compass, which could be wildly imprudent. In essence:
-psychological and flow-through effects of helping those in proximity to you are likely undervalued in extreme situations where you are the only one capable of mitigating the problem
-effects of community flow-through effects in developed countries regarding altruistic social acts in general may be undervalued, especially if they uniquely foster one’s own well-being or moral character through exercise of a “moral muscle”
-it is imprudent to ignore strong moral intuition, especially in emergency scenarios, and it is important to Make a Habit of not ignoring strong intuition (unless further reflection leads to the natural modification/dissipation of that intuition)
To me, naive application of utilitarianism often leads to underestimating these considerations.
There was meant to be an “all else equal” clause in there (as usually goes without saying in these sorts of thought experiments) -- otherwise, as you say, the verdict wouldn’t necessarily indicate underlying non-utilitarian concerns at all.
Perhaps easiest to imagine if you modify the thought experiment so that your psychology (memories, “moral muscles”, etc.) will be “reset” after making the decision. I’m talking about those who would insist that you still ought to save the one over the two even then—no matter how the purely utilitarian considerations play out.
Yeah honestly I don’t think there is a single true deontologist on Earth. To say anything is good or addresses the good, including deontology, one must define the “good” aimed at.
I think personal/direct situations entail a slew of complicating factors that a utilitarian should consider. As a response to that uncertainty, it is often rational to lean on intuition. And, thus, it is bad to undermine that intuition habitually.
“Directness” inherently means higher level of physical/emotional involvement, different (likely closer to home) social landscape and stakes, etc. So constructing an “all else being equal” scenario is impossible.
Related to initial deontologist point: when your average person expresses a “directness matters” view, it is very likely they are expressing concern for these considerations, rather than actually having a diehard deontologist view (even if they use language that suggests that).