My own attraction to a bucket approach (in the sense of (1) above) is motivated by a combination of:
(a) reject the demand for commensurability across buckets.
(b) make a bet on plausible deontic constraints e.g. duty to prioritise members of the community of which you are a part.
(c) avoid impractical zig-zagging when best guess assumptions change.
Insofar as I’m more into philosophical pragmatism than foundationalism, I’m more inclined to see a messy collection of reasons like these as philosophically adequate.
I think there are two things to justify here:
The commitment to a GHW bucket, where that commitment involves “we want to allocate roughly X% of our resources to this”.
The particular interventions we fund within the GHW resource bucket.
I think the justification for (1) is going to look very different to the justification for (2).
I’m not sure which one you’re addressing, it sounds like more (2) than (1).
I’m more interested in (1), but how we justify that could have implications for (2).
My own attraction to a bucket approach (in the sense of (1) above) is motivated by a combination of:
(a) reject the demand for commensurability across buckets.
(b) make a bet on plausible deontic constraints e.g. duty to prioritise members of the community of which you are a part.
(c) avoid impractical zig-zagging when best guess assumptions change.
Insofar as I’m more into philosophical pragmatism than foundationalism, I’m more inclined to see a messy collection of reasons like these as philosophically adequate.