Hi! Yeah, as per footnote 3, I think the âreliable capacity growthâ bucket could end up being more expansive than just GHD. (Which is to say: it seems that reasons of principle would favor comparing these various charities against each other, insofar as weâre able.) But I donât have a view on precisely where to draw the line for what counts as âreliableâ vs âspeculativeâ.
Whether causes like FF and SM belong in the âreliable capacity growthâ or âpure suffering reductionâ buckets depends on whether their beneficiaries can be expected to be more productive. I would guess that the case for productivity benefits is stronger for SM than for FF (depression is notoriously disabling). But Iâm happy to defer to those who know more empirical details.
would you recommend that GHD charity evaluators more explicitly change their optimization target from metrics which measure directly helping others /â suffering reduction (QALYs, WELLBYs) to âglobal capacity growthâ metrics?
This is an important question. Iâm actually not sure. After all, the case for âreliable capacity growthâ over âspeculative moonshotsâ depends on a kind of pessimism about the prospects for hyper-rationalistic targeted efforts to directly improve the far-future. So it would depend upon whether we could identify suitably reliable metrics of the kind of impact weâre hoping for. I donât know whether we canâI think it would be worth researchers looking into this question. If it turns out that we canât find better metrics, I think we could reasonably take âQALYs within reasonâ (i.e. excluding obvious exceptions as mentioned in the OP) as the best metric we have for pursuing this goal.
Hi! Yeah, as per footnote 3, I think the âreliable capacity growthâ bucket could end up being more expansive than just GHD. (Which is to say: it seems that reasons of principle would favor comparing these various charities against each other, insofar as weâre able.) But I donât have a view on precisely where to draw the line for what counts as âreliableâ vs âspeculativeâ.
Whether causes like FF and SM belong in the âreliable capacity growthâ or âpure suffering reductionâ buckets depends on whether their beneficiaries can be expected to be more productive. I would guess that the case for productivity benefits is stronger for SM than for FF (depression is notoriously disabling). But Iâm happy to defer to those who know more empirical details.
This is an important question. Iâm actually not sure. After all, the case for âreliable capacity growthâ over âspeculative moonshotsâ depends on a kind of pessimism about the prospects for hyper-rationalistic targeted efforts to directly improve the far-future. So it would depend upon whether we could identify suitably reliable metrics of the kind of impact weâre hoping for. I donât know whether we canâI think it would be worth researchers looking into this question. If it turns out that we canât find better metrics, I think we could reasonably take âQALYs within reasonâ (i.e. excluding obvious exceptions as mentioned in the OP) as the best metric we have for pursuing this goal.