Executive summary: This exploratory essay argues that even if we are completely clueless about the long-term effects of our actions on suffering, we can still justifiably focus on reducing suffering within the scope of consequences we can realistically assess, by giving non-zero weight to “scope-adjusted” consequentialist views that offer practical guidance when others do not.
Key points:
Cluelessness doesn’t necessarily paralyze action: Even if we assume total long-term cluelessness about the net effects of our actions, we can still reasonably act on views that guide us within a scope of reasonably foreseeable consequences.
Scope-adjusted consequentialism provides practical guidance: By assigning some weight to versions of consequentialism that prioritize assessable consequences (e.g. “reasonable consequentialism”), we retain action-guiding moral recommendations.
Asymmetry justifies action: If one view gives no recommendations (due to cluelessness) and another gives actionable guidance (due to limited scope), it is rational to follow the latter even with minimal credence in it.
Toy models illustrate “medium-termism”: Simple models suggest that most of the value we can influence lies within the next several centuries or millennia, offering a plausible time horizon for focused efforts.
Giving weight to multiple views is epistemically and morally defensible: Moral uncertainty, practical paralysis, and modesty all support assigning partial weight to multiple plausible theories, including scope-adjusted ones.
Moral responsibility may track assessability: The idea that “ought implies can” supports the notion that we have stronger duties within the domains we can realistically influence, making scope-adjusted views both intuitive and justified.
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Executive summary: This exploratory essay argues that even if we are completely clueless about the long-term effects of our actions on suffering, we can still justifiably focus on reducing suffering within the scope of consequences we can realistically assess, by giving non-zero weight to “scope-adjusted” consequentialist views that offer practical guidance when others do not.
Key points:
Cluelessness doesn’t necessarily paralyze action: Even if we assume total long-term cluelessness about the net effects of our actions, we can still reasonably act on views that guide us within a scope of reasonably foreseeable consequences.
Scope-adjusted consequentialism provides practical guidance: By assigning some weight to versions of consequentialism that prioritize assessable consequences (e.g. “reasonable consequentialism”), we retain action-guiding moral recommendations.
Asymmetry justifies action: If one view gives no recommendations (due to cluelessness) and another gives actionable guidance (due to limited scope), it is rational to follow the latter even with minimal credence in it.
Toy models illustrate “medium-termism”: Simple models suggest that most of the value we can influence lies within the next several centuries or millennia, offering a plausible time horizon for focused efforts.
Giving weight to multiple views is epistemically and morally defensible: Moral uncertainty, practical paralysis, and modesty all support assigning partial weight to multiple plausible theories, including scope-adjusted ones.
Moral responsibility may track assessability: The idea that “ought implies can” supports the notion that we have stronger duties within the domains we can realistically influence, making scope-adjusted views both intuitive and justified.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.