I don’t think McMahan would find what you call a ‘solution’ very appealing: McMahan doesn’t think that morality is demanding in the way e.g. Singer does. Further, what you suggest ought to be the default position—morality is really demanding—is something only a small percentage of philosophers (although many EAs) believe is correct.
He doesn’t indicate that there is a reason to consider it unappealing. It’s not a matter of whether he agrees, it’s a matter of whether it’s a substantive view that ought to be addressed.
The literature on moral demandingness is fairly split. The proposition that morality is demanding is different from the proposition that demandingness is not a moral problem. The majority of philosophers believe in theories which happen to not turn out to be very demanding in our current world; that does not necessarily mean that they did so because those theories are less demanding, so their views don’t really diminish the viability of positing demanding moral principles in response to a new moral problem.
I don’t think McMahan would find what you call a ‘solution’ very appealing: McMahan doesn’t think that morality is demanding in the way e.g. Singer does. Further, what you suggest ought to be the default position—morality is really demanding—is something only a small percentage of philosophers (although many EAs) believe is correct.
He doesn’t indicate that there is a reason to consider it unappealing. It’s not a matter of whether he agrees, it’s a matter of whether it’s a substantive view that ought to be addressed.
The literature on moral demandingness is fairly split. The proposition that morality is demanding is different from the proposition that demandingness is not a moral problem. The majority of philosophers believe in theories which happen to not turn out to be very demanding in our current world; that does not necessarily mean that they did so because those theories are less demanding, so their views don’t really diminish the viability of positing demanding moral principles in response to a new moral problem.