But I ultimately decided against doing that for a variety of reasons, including that it was very costly to me,
Epistemic status: not fleshed out
(This comment is not specifically directed to Rebecca’s situation, although it does allude to her situation in one point as an example.)
I observe that the powers-that-be could make it less costly for knowledgeable people to come forward and speak out. For example, some people may have legal obligations, such as the duties a board member owes a corporation (extending in some cases to former board members).[1] Organizations may be able to waive those duties by granting consent. Likewise, people may have concerns[2] about libel-law exposure (especially to the extent they have exposure to the world’s libel-tourism capital, the UK). Individuals and organizations can mitigate these concerns by, for instance, agreeing not to sue any community member for libel or any similar tort for FTX/SBF-related speech. (One could imagine an exception for suits brought in the United States in which the individual or organization concedes their status as a public figure, and does not present any other claims that would allow a finding of liability without proof of “actual malice.”)
Other types of costs are harder to legibly and credibly mitigate—such as fear of discrimination by grantmakers. That hews back to prior discussion about providing financial, legal, and other support to whistleblowers, which might require a commitment of fairly serious money (and a credible, independent decisionmaker) depending on the circumstances.
In any event, I would view organizations and individuals who made some specific, public, credible, and legible attempts to reduce the costs of others exposing their potential mistakes or wrongdoing in a positive manner. Among other things, it would be at least a mildly costly signal for someone who had badly erred, and thus would reduce my estimate of the probability that that person or organization had actually done so.
Moreover, in EA, the lines between what one knows in one’s capacity as a board member and what ones knows in their capacity as a private person are probably blurrier than for someone on (e.g.) the board of General Electric.
In my general view, laypersons often overstate these concerns, at least if they only have practical legal exposure to judgments that comply with US law. But the concerns may still silence important speech.
Epistemic status: not fleshed out
(This comment is not specifically directed to Rebecca’s situation, although it does allude to her situation in one point as an example.)
I observe that the powers-that-be could make it less costly for knowledgeable people to come forward and speak out. For example, some people may have legal obligations, such as the duties a board member owes a corporation (extending in some cases to former board members).[1] Organizations may be able to waive those duties by granting consent. Likewise, people may have concerns[2] about libel-law exposure (especially to the extent they have exposure to the world’s libel-tourism capital, the UK). Individuals and organizations can mitigate these concerns by, for instance, agreeing not to sue any community member for libel or any similar tort for FTX/SBF-related speech. (One could imagine an exception for suits brought in the United States in which the individual or organization concedes their status as a public figure, and does not present any other claims that would allow a finding of liability without proof of “actual malice.”)
Other types of costs are harder to legibly and credibly mitigate—such as fear of discrimination by grantmakers. That hews back to prior discussion about providing financial, legal, and other support to whistleblowers, which might require a commitment of fairly serious money (and a credible, independent decisionmaker) depending on the circumstances.
In any event, I would view organizations and individuals who made some specific, public, credible, and legible attempts to reduce the costs of others exposing their potential mistakes or wrongdoing in a positive manner. Among other things, it would be at least a mildly costly signal for someone who had badly erred, and thus would reduce my estimate of the probability that that person or organization had actually done so.
Moreover, in EA, the lines between what one knows in one’s capacity as a board member and what ones knows in their capacity as a private person are probably blurrier than for someone on (e.g.) the board of General Electric.
In my general view, laypersons often overstate these concerns, at least if they only have practical legal exposure to judgments that comply with US law. But the concerns may still silence important speech.