Depends whether procedural rationality suffices for modal knowledge (e.g. if false modal views are ultimately incoherent; false moral views certainly donāt seem incoherent).
Smartness might be necessary for substantive insights, but doesnāt seem sufficient. There are plenty of smart philosophers with substantively misguided views, after all.
A metaphor: think of belief space as a giant spider web, with no single center, but instead a large number of such ācentralā clusters, each representing a maximally internally coherent and defensible set of beliefs. We start off somewhere in this web. Reasoning leads us along a strand, typically in the direction of greater coherenceāi.e., towards a cluster. But if the clusters are not differentiated in any neutrally-recognizable wayāthe truths do not glow in a way that sets them apart from ideally coherent falsehoodsāthen thereās no guarantee that philosophical reasoning (or āintelligenceā) will lead you to the truth. All it can do is lead you towards greater coherence.
Thatās still worth pursuing, because the truth sure isnāt going to be somewhere incoherent. But it seems likely that from most possible starting points (e.g. if chosen arbitrarily), the truth would be forever inaccessible.
I think I just disagree about what reasoning is. I think that reasoning does not just make our existing beliefs more coherent, but allows us to grasp new deep truths. For example, I think that an anti-realist who didnāt originally have the FTI irrational intuition could grasp it by reflection, and that one can, over time, discover that some things are just not worth pursuing and others are.
Depends whether procedural rationality suffices for modal knowledge (e.g. if false modal views are ultimately incoherent; false moral views certainly donāt seem incoherent).
Smartness might be necessary for substantive insights, but doesnāt seem sufficient. There are plenty of smart philosophers with substantively misguided views, after all.
A metaphor: think of belief space as a giant spider web, with no single center, but instead a large number of such ācentralā clusters, each representing a maximally internally coherent and defensible set of beliefs. We start off somewhere in this web. Reasoning leads us along a strand, typically in the direction of greater coherenceāi.e., towards a cluster. But if the clusters are not differentiated in any neutrally-recognizable wayāthe truths do not glow in a way that sets them apart from ideally coherent falsehoodsāthen thereās no guarantee that philosophical reasoning (or āintelligenceā) will lead you to the truth. All it can do is lead you towards greater coherence.
Thatās still worth pursuing, because the truth sure isnāt going to be somewhere incoherent. But it seems likely that from most possible starting points (e.g. if chosen arbitrarily), the truth would be forever inaccessible.
I think I just disagree about what reasoning is. I think that reasoning does not just make our existing beliefs more coherent, but allows us to grasp new deep truths. For example, I think that an anti-realist who didnāt originally have the FTI irrational intuition could grasp it by reflection, and that one can, over time, discover that some things are just not worth pursuing and others are.