But there’s a third sense of wrong that’s slightly more slippery, which utilitarians can gladly affirm. This is about who merits significant criticism and ostracization for their behavior. You, by not giving to charity, have not acted optimally. Ted Bundy, by killing people, has also not acted optimally. Yet there’s a categorical difference between your action and Ted’s. Ted should be thrown in jail—you shouldn’t. Ted is significantly and abnormally blameworthy while you are not.
If someone is really, truly going “full consequentialist” shouldn’t they believe that criticism or ostracism is merited based on the consequences of doing those things? So if Ted Bundy’s murder elasticity with regard to your criticism is weak and your actions don’t contribute much to deterrence, he actually doesn’t deserve much criticism. Whereas if someone’s donation elasticity with regard to your criticizing/ostracizing is high then they would be worthy of criticism/ostracism.
Its definitely possible that there are consequentialist reasons that things might turn out the way you say, but it seems kinda convenient that these match up with certain deontological intuitions (prohibition on murder vs no charity obligation).
I also agree with Richard that what determines how blameworthy a person is has a lot to do with the extent of their exertion of willpower for the sake of morality. If you have ten trillion dollars, while giving a million dollars to charity is a very good thing to do, you don’t get many virtue points as it requires almost no sacrifice from you. In contrast, if you’re poor but still donate, because doing so is psychologically taxing, you get virtue points. This is one reason why vegans get virtue points.
I agree with this on an intuitive level, but to me it suggests that I’m not fully a consequentialist, but rather that my views are kind of a messy mix of different moral theories, such that virtues and degree of deontologic violations all get thrown into the equation.
If someone is really, truly going “full consequentialist” shouldn’t they believe that criticism or ostracism is merited based on the consequences of doing those things? So if Ted Bundy’s murder elasticity with regard to your criticism is weak and your actions don’t contribute much to deterrence, he actually doesn’t deserve much criticism. Whereas if someone’s donation elasticity with regard to your criticizing/ostracizing is high then they would be worthy of criticism/ostracism.
Its definitely possible that there are consequentialist reasons that things might turn out the way you say, but it seems kinda convenient that these match up with certain deontological intuitions (prohibition on murder vs no charity obligation).
I agree with this on an intuitive level, but to me it suggests that I’m not fully a consequentialist, but rather that my views are kind of a messy mix of different moral theories, such that virtues and degree of deontologic violations all get thrown into the equation.