There are a handful of policy issues where the implications of cosmopolitanism seem relatively clear: governments should give the interests of foreigners more weight in decisions that affect them
I think this is a slightly less clear-cut example than one might think. Traditionally most political philosophers who sought to justify the coercive power of the state have felt that the best or only way to do so was based on the special relationship between citizens and each other, and between citizens and a state. For example, the Fair Play argument given in various forms by Rawls (1971), Arneson (1982), Dagger (1997) and Klosko (2005), is based on the immorality of ‘free riding’, which isn’t really applicable to foreign aid. Dworkin (1986) and Horton (2006)’s argument from associative duties is similar in this regard. And clearly any conception based on consent will be local. I realise there are plenty of examples of philosophers who disagree with this and side with you, but my impression of the literature is that the localist side is dominant—and certainly not negligible. Perhaps as individuals our positive duties are cosmopolitan, but states are rightfully partial.
Just a few remarks. Firstly, Rawls (1971) exercised several (grossly) simplifying assumptions pursuant to a domestic conception of justice, necessarily including the omission of questions of international distribution and migratory rights. This is exactly what gave rise to his students thinking A Theory of Justice could be unproblematically extended to the global sphere, only to be disappointed when Rawls views formalised twenty-years later in The Law of Peoples. Secondly, in my exposure, the emergence of global justice as a dominant issue in Anglophone political philosophy since the 1990s is, like the rest of the field, constituted almost entirely by various stripes of liberal egalitarianism. Most of whom admit no intrinsic right of national cultures to closed memberships of bounded territories. They are nearly all luck egalitarians to start with. Thirdly and most importantly, the persuasion of philosophical literature, which yields just about zero policy effect, has no relation whatsoever to whether ‘cosmopolitanism...[entails that] governments should give the interests of foreigners more weight in decisions that affect them’. In the terminology of the philosophical literature, and the definition given by the original poster, cosmopolitanism and ethical impartialism are one and the same.
I think this is a slightly less clear-cut example than one might think. Traditionally most political philosophers who sought to justify the coercive power of the state have felt that the best or only way to do so was based on the special relationship between citizens and each other, and between citizens and a state. For example, the Fair Play argument given in various forms by Rawls (1971), Arneson (1982), Dagger (1997) and Klosko (2005), is based on the immorality of ‘free riding’, which isn’t really applicable to foreign aid. Dworkin (1986) and Horton (2006)’s argument from associative duties is similar in this regard. And clearly any conception based on consent will be local. I realise there are plenty of examples of philosophers who disagree with this and side with you, but my impression of the literature is that the localist side is dominant—and certainly not negligible. Perhaps as individuals our positive duties are cosmopolitan, but states are rightfully partial.
Just a few remarks. Firstly, Rawls (1971) exercised several (grossly) simplifying assumptions pursuant to a domestic conception of justice, necessarily including the omission of questions of international distribution and migratory rights. This is exactly what gave rise to his students thinking A Theory of Justice could be unproblematically extended to the global sphere, only to be disappointed when Rawls views formalised twenty-years later in The Law of Peoples. Secondly, in my exposure, the emergence of global justice as a dominant issue in Anglophone political philosophy since the 1990s is, like the rest of the field, constituted almost entirely by various stripes of liberal egalitarianism. Most of whom admit no intrinsic right of national cultures to closed memberships of bounded territories. They are nearly all luck egalitarians to start with. Thirdly and most importantly, the persuasion of philosophical literature, which yields just about zero policy effect, has no relation whatsoever to whether ‘cosmopolitanism...[entails that] governments should give the interests of foreigners more weight in decisions that affect them’. In the terminology of the philosophical literature, and the definition given by the original poster, cosmopolitanism and ethical impartialism are one and the same.