I think the answer to your first question is mostly contained in my response to Owen. I agree that in theory cosmopolitans might disagree on immigration reform, but I chose not to talk much about it because I thought talking about cosmopolitanism and military intervention was more interesting.
For your second question, yeah, I would want to apply cosmopolitanism to cities, too. Though drill down to very small groups, and I’m less eager to take a hard stance. Bryan Caplan thinks we have special obligations to family members, but that has
Maybe I should wrap some of these comments up into a clarifying addendum.
Re the first question, I think I was missing a connotation you associate between the word ‘cosmopolitanism’ and political / nation-oriented interventions. Perhaps you were guarding against the interpretation that being a ‘citizen of the world’ (as opposed to a citizen of one’s homeland) requires one to endorse open borders or world governments.
Re the second question, perhaps we should say that cosmopolitanism is about being indifferent to where strangers and acquaintances live or have lived (including where they were born), but it’s not about being indifferent to whether someone’s a stranger vs. a close friend.
So if you live in a town of 200 and are close friends with all those people, cosmopolitanism says it’s fine to strongly privilege your town over other towns, by analogy with its being fine to privilege your family/friends over others’ families/friends. But if you live in a city of 200,000 and don’t know the vast majority of residents, cosmopolitanism forbids privileging arbitrary residents of your city over arbitrary residents of other cities.
I’m not sure it makes sense to invoke ‘cosmopolitanism’ in the singular, when it admits great internal diversity. Insofar as I can tell however, cosmpolitanism in the global justice literature is overwhelmingly predicated on either luck egalitarianism (that persons should not receive benefit or burden for things they cannot reasonably be held accountable for) and/or utilitarianism, neither of which allow any necessary moral distinction between friend and stranger.
I think the answer to your first question is mostly contained in my response to Owen. I agree that in theory cosmopolitans might disagree on immigration reform, but I chose not to talk much about it because I thought talking about cosmopolitanism and military intervention was more interesting.
For your second question, yeah, I would want to apply cosmopolitanism to cities, too. Though drill down to very small groups, and I’m less eager to take a hard stance. Bryan Caplan thinks we have special obligations to family members, but that has
Maybe I should wrap some of these comments up into a clarifying addendum.
Re the first question, I think I was missing a connotation you associate between the word ‘cosmopolitanism’ and political / nation-oriented interventions. Perhaps you were guarding against the interpretation that being a ‘citizen of the world’ (as opposed to a citizen of one’s homeland) requires one to endorse open borders or world governments.
Re the second question, perhaps we should say that cosmopolitanism is about being indifferent to where strangers and acquaintances live or have lived (including where they were born), but it’s not about being indifferent to whether someone’s a stranger vs. a close friend.
So if you live in a town of 200 and are close friends with all those people, cosmopolitanism says it’s fine to strongly privilege your town over other towns, by analogy with its being fine to privilege your family/friends over others’ families/friends. But if you live in a city of 200,000 and don’t know the vast majority of residents, cosmopolitanism forbids privileging arbitrary residents of your city over arbitrary residents of other cities.
I’m not sure it makes sense to invoke ‘cosmopolitanism’ in the singular, when it admits great internal diversity. Insofar as I can tell however, cosmpolitanism in the global justice literature is overwhelmingly predicated on either luck egalitarianism (that persons should not receive benefit or burden for things they cannot reasonably be held accountable for) and/or utilitarianism, neither of which allow any necessary moral distinction between friend and stranger.