There are two different claims here: one is “type x research is not very useful” and the other is “we should be doing more type y research at the margin”. In the comment above, you seem to be defending the latter, but your earlier comments support the former. I don’t think we necessarily disagree on the latter claim (perhaps on how to divide x from y, and the optimal proportion of x and y, but not on the core claim). But note that the second claim is somewhat tangential to the original post. If type x research is valuable, then even though we might want more type y research at the margin, this isn’t a consideration against a particular instance of type x research. Of course, if type x research is (in general or in this instance) not very useful, then this is of direct relevance to a post that is an instance of type x research. It seems important not to conflate these, or to move from a defense of the former to a defense of the latter. Above, you acknowledge that type x research can be valuable, so you don’t hold the general claim that type x research isn’t useful. I think you do hold the view that either this particular instance of research or this subclass of type x research is not useful. I think that’s fine, but I think it’s important not to frame this as merely a disagreement about what kinds of research should be done at the margin, since this is not the source of the disagreement.
Of course, if type x research is (in general or in this instance) not very useful, then this is of direct relevance to a post that is an instance of type x research. It seems important not to conflate these, or to move from a defense of the former to a defense of the latter.
You’re imposing on my argument a structure that it didn’t have. My argument is that prima facie, analysing the concepts of effectiveness is not the most useful work that is presently to be done. If you look at my original post, it’s clear that it had a parallel argument structure: i) this post seems mostly not new, and ii) posts of this kind are over-invested. It was well-hedged, and made lots of relative claims (“on the margin”, “I am generally not very interested” etc. so it’s really weird to be repeatedly told that I was arguing something else.
I think that’s fine, but I think it’s important not to frame this as merely a disagreement about what kinds of research should be done at the margin, since this is not the source of the disagreement.
The general disagreement about whether philosophical analysis is under-invested is source of about half of the disagreement. I’ve talked to Stefan and Ben, and I think that I was convinced that philosophical analysis was prima facie under-invested atm, then I would view analysis of principles of effectiveness a fair bit more favorably. I could imagine that if they became fully convinced that practical work was much more neglected then they might want to see more project proposals and literature reviews done too.
There are two different claims here: one is “type x research is not very useful” and the other is “we should be doing more type y research at the margin”. In the comment above, you seem to be defending the latter, but your earlier comments support the former. I don’t think we necessarily disagree on the latter claim (perhaps on how to divide x from y, and the optimal proportion of x and y, but not on the core claim). But note that the second claim is somewhat tangential to the original post. If type x research is valuable, then even though we might want more type y research at the margin, this isn’t a consideration against a particular instance of type x research. Of course, if type x research is (in general or in this instance) not very useful, then this is of direct relevance to a post that is an instance of type x research. It seems important not to conflate these, or to move from a defense of the former to a defense of the latter. Above, you acknowledge that type x research can be valuable, so you don’t hold the general claim that type x research isn’t useful. I think you do hold the view that either this particular instance of research or this subclass of type x research is not useful. I think that’s fine, but I think it’s important not to frame this as merely a disagreement about what kinds of research should be done at the margin, since this is not the source of the disagreement.
You’re imposing on my argument a structure that it didn’t have. My argument is that prima facie, analysing the concepts of effectiveness is not the most useful work that is presently to be done. If you look at my original post, it’s clear that it had a parallel argument structure: i) this post seems mostly not new, and ii) posts of this kind are over-invested. It was well-hedged, and made lots of relative claims (“on the margin”, “I am generally not very interested” etc. so it’s really weird to be repeatedly told that I was arguing something else.
The general disagreement about whether philosophical analysis is under-invested is source of about half of the disagreement. I’ve talked to Stefan and Ben, and I think that I was convinced that philosophical analysis was prima facie under-invested atm, then I would view analysis of principles of effectiveness a fair bit more favorably. I could imagine that if they became fully convinced that practical work was much more neglected then they might want to see more project proposals and literature reviews done too.