I do think it is important to distinguish these moral uncertainty reasons from moral trade and cooperation and strategic considerations for hedging. My argument for putting some focus on near-termist causes would be of this latter kind; the putative moral uncertainty/worldview diversification arguments for hedging carry little weight with me.
As an example, Greaves and Ord argue that under the expected choiceworthiness approach, our metanormative ought is practically the same as the total utilitarian ought.
It’s tricky because the paper on strong longtermism makes the theory sound like it does want to completely ignore other causes—eg ‘short-term effects can be ignored’. I think it would be useful to have a source to point to that states ‘the case for longtermism’ without giving the impression that no other causes matter.
I do think it is important to distinguish these moral uncertainty reasons from moral trade and cooperation and strategic considerations for hedging. My argument for putting some focus on near-termist causes would be of this latter kind; the putative moral uncertainty/worldview diversification arguments for hedging carry little weight with me.
As an example, Greaves and Ord argue that under the expected choiceworthiness approach, our metanormative ought is practically the same as the total utilitarian ought.
It’s tricky because the paper on strong longtermism makes the theory sound like it does want to completely ignore other causes—eg ‘short-term effects can be ignored’. I think it would be useful to have a source to point to that states ‘the case for longtermism’ without giving the impression that no other causes matter.