Iâm unsure why this got downvoted, but I strongly agree with the sentiment in the parent. Although I understand the impulse of âWeâre all roughly on the same team here, so we can try and sculpt something better than the typically competitive/âadversarial relationships between firms, or employers and employeesâ, I think this is apt to mislead one into ideas which are typically economically short-sighted, often morally objectionable, and occasionally legally dubious.
In the extreme case, itâs obviously unacceptable for Org X to not hire candidate A (their best applicant), because they believe its better they stay at Org Y. Not only (per the parent) that A is probably a better judge of where they are best placed,[1] but Org X screws over not only itself (they now appoint someone they think are not quite as good) and A themselves (who doesnât get the job they want), for the benefit of Org Y.
These sort of oligosponic machinations are at best a breach of various fiduciary duties (e.g. Org X to their donors to use their money to get the best staff rather than opaque de facto transfer contributions of labour to another organisation), and at least colourably illegal in many jurisdictions due to labour law around anti-trust, non-discrimination, etc. (see)
Similar sentiments apply to less extreme examples, such as ânot proactively âpoachingâł (the linked case above was about alleged âno cold callâ agreements). The typical story for why these practices are disliked is a mix of econ efficiency arguments (e.g. labour market liquidity, competition over conditions is a mechanism for higher performing staff to match into higher performing orgs) and worker welfare ones (e.g. the net result typically disadvantages workers by suppressing their pay, conditions, and reducing their ability to change to roles they prefer).
I think these rationales apply roughly as well to EA-land as anywhere else-land. Orgs should accept that staff may occasionally leave to other orgs for a variety of reasons. If they find that they consistently lose out for familiar reasons, they should either get better or accept the consequences for remaining worse.
[1]: Although, for the avoidance of doubt, I think it is wholly acceptable for people to switch EA jobs for wholly ânon-EAâ reasonsâe.g. âYeah, I expect Iâd do less good at Org X than Org Y, but Org X will pay me 20% more and I want a higher standard of living.â Moral sainthood is scarce as well as precious. It is unrealistic that all candidates are saintly in this sense, and mutual pretence to the contrary unhelpful.
If anything, âno poachingâ (etc.) practices are even worse in these cases than the more saintly âmoving so I can do even more good!â rationale. In the latter case, Orgs are merely being immodest in presuming to know better than applicants what their best opportunity to contribute is; in the former, Orgs conspire to make their employeesâ lives worse than they could otherwise be.
[Own views etc.]
Iâm unsure why this got downvoted, but I strongly agree with the sentiment in the parent. Although I understand the impulse of âWeâre all roughly on the same team here, so we can try and sculpt something better than the typically competitive/âadversarial relationships between firms, or employers and employeesâ, I think this is apt to mislead one into ideas which are typically economically short-sighted, often morally objectionable, and occasionally legally dubious.
In the extreme case, itâs obviously unacceptable for Org X to not hire candidate A (their best applicant), because they believe its better they stay at Org Y. Not only (per the parent) that A is probably a better judge of where they are best placed,[1] but Org X screws over not only itself (they now appoint someone they think are not quite as good) and A themselves (who doesnât get the job they want), for the benefit of Org Y.
These sort of oligosponic machinations are at best a breach of various fiduciary duties (e.g. Org X to their donors to use their money to get the best staff rather than opaque de facto transfer contributions of labour to another organisation), and at least colourably illegal in many jurisdictions due to labour law around anti-trust, non-discrimination, etc. (see)
Similar sentiments apply to less extreme examples, such as ânot proactively âpoachingâł (the linked case above was about alleged âno cold callâ agreements). The typical story for why these practices are disliked is a mix of econ efficiency arguments (e.g. labour market liquidity, competition over conditions is a mechanism for higher performing staff to match into higher performing orgs) and worker welfare ones (e.g. the net result typically disadvantages workers by suppressing their pay, conditions, and reducing their ability to change to roles they prefer).
I think these rationales apply roughly as well to EA-land as anywhere else-land. Orgs should accept that staff may occasionally leave to other orgs for a variety of reasons. If they find that they consistently lose out for familiar reasons, they should either get better or accept the consequences for remaining worse.
[1]: Although, for the avoidance of doubt, I think it is wholly acceptable for people to switch EA jobs for wholly ânon-EAâ reasonsâe.g. âYeah, I expect Iâd do less good at Org X than Org Y, but Org X will pay me 20% more and I want a higher standard of living.â Moral sainthood is scarce as well as precious. It is unrealistic that all candidates are saintly in this sense, and mutual pretence to the contrary unhelpful.
If anything, âno poachingâ (etc.) practices are even worse in these cases than the more saintly âmoving so I can do even more good!â rationale. In the latter case, Orgs are merely being immodest in presuming to know better than applicants what their best opportunity to contribute is; in the former, Orgs conspire to make their employeesâ lives worse than they could otherwise be.