Thank you Richard – I think your second intuition is a great point. Does this rephrasing capture your point? I included the notion of decisiveness as well, which is related. If so, and with your permission, I would add to the main post.
+++ 7. EU-level policymaking is slower to react to events like AGI and/or less decisive Compared to the US or China, the EU has little centralized power and resources. All 27 EU member states preserve significant control over EU decision-making, as embodied by veto powers and “executive” procedures that still require member states’ collective approval. This is occasionally made more difficult by the European Parliament, which includes 7 political parties and 705 members and whose power has been growing over the years. As a result, most decisions from the European Commission require consultations with many stakeholders and therefore take time. Moreover, the EU-level public budget represents ~1.5% of GDP, compared to ~20% of GDP in the US – so even when there is agreement, it is unclear whether it can garner the resources to whip up a decisive response. This structure also prevents the EU to produce the equivalent of US executive orders.
How does it affect the EU’s relevance?
If the development of AGI requires a quick or well-resourced policy response from government, EU-level policymaking might not be as influential as American or Chinese policymaking.
+++
My opinion: This factor is definitely relevant, so thanks for bringing it up; I think it crucially depends on takeoff speeds though. (Anyone with a better understanding of US policymaking should correct me if I am wrong here:) If AGI requires strong and one-off government interventions within a 3-6 month window, US policymaking offers a considerable advantage through its strong and quick executive powers. However, for interventions with time horizons of over 6 months where emergency is not as important, the case for executive orders fades as far as I understand. Decision-making therefore falls onto the legislative power, which has been deadlocked for the past 12 years. On the EU’s side however, legislative power has been particularly strong – spurning tech policies with relative ease. Even though the EU procedure is slow, I have the intuition its impact is more structural than US executive orders (please correct me?). In the cases where AGI safety requires a government intervention within 3-6 months, my hope would be that institutions are already in place to guarantee that this quick intervention takes place – e.g. a regulatory agency that has been mandated to do AI code probing and auditing for >20 years before takeoff, for whom AI labs alignment would be common practice.
This conversation makes me realize a more constructive version of this post would list “important factors” for the relevance of the EU rather than arguments in favour and against. Ah well.
Thank you Richard – I think your second intuition is a great point. Does this rephrasing capture your point? I included the notion of decisiveness as well, which is related. If so, and with your permission, I would add to the main post.
+++
7. EU-level policymaking is slower to react to events like AGI and/or less decisive
Compared to the US or China, the EU has little centralized power and resources. All 27 EU member states preserve significant control over EU decision-making, as embodied by veto powers and “executive” procedures that still require member states’ collective approval. This is occasionally made more difficult by the European Parliament, which includes 7 political parties and 705 members and whose power has been growing over the years. As a result, most decisions from the European Commission require consultations with many stakeholders and therefore take time. Moreover, the EU-level public budget represents ~1.5% of GDP, compared to ~20% of GDP in the US – so even when there is agreement, it is unclear whether it can garner the resources to whip up a decisive response. This structure also prevents the EU to produce the equivalent of US executive orders.
How does it affect the EU’s relevance?
If the development of AGI requires a quick or well-resourced policy response from government, EU-level policymaking might not be as influential as American or Chinese policymaking.
+++
My opinion:
This factor is definitely relevant, so thanks for bringing it up; I think it crucially depends on takeoff speeds though. (Anyone with a better understanding of US policymaking should correct me if I am wrong here:) If AGI requires strong and one-off government interventions within a 3-6 month window, US policymaking offers a considerable advantage through its strong and quick executive powers. However, for interventions with time horizons of over 6 months where emergency is not as important, the case for executive orders fades as far as I understand. Decision-making therefore falls onto the legislative power, which has been deadlocked for the past 12 years. On the EU’s side however, legislative power has been particularly strong – spurning tech policies with relative ease. Even though the EU procedure is slow, I have the intuition its impact is more structural than US executive orders (please correct me?). In the cases where AGI safety requires a government intervention within 3-6 months, my hope would be that institutions are already in place to guarantee that this quick intervention takes place – e.g. a regulatory agency that has been mandated to do AI code probing and auditing for >20 years before takeoff, for whom AI labs alignment would be common practice.
This conversation makes me realize a more constructive version of this post would list “important factors” for the relevance of the EU rather than arguments in favour and against. Ah well.