Hi Linch, Great question. Probability estimates about the future are always difficult—we can give you some loose indications of what we expect, though these should be taken with a grain of salt.
1. A two month timeline may be hard to estimate, as things can often run more slowly when starting in a new country. However, we can give more confident estimates on a three month timeline (which offers some buffer room).
We’d attach a reasonably high probability to having enough information to make these decisions within the next 3 months (~80%). Our decision-relevant data gaps at the moment are a) about the level of lead paint use in Malawi, and b) about the tractability of meeting with Malawian politicians. However, we have ways to test both of these things, and identify whether they should be a disqualifying factor, and have strong leads on the connections required to get this information.
2. Our probability of piloting in Malawi is also quite high, as the early indicators of burden and tractability seem quite strong. We’ve managed to find a 2017 study on the level of lead in paint in Malawi which indicates that this country would be highly promising to target. The study found that 56% of paint tested in Malawi had more than 90ppm, and 37.5% had more than 600ppm - this makes us think that it is quite likely that lead is a significant contributor to the overall burden of lead poisoning in Malawi. On the tractability side, making contacts within Malawi has also been much easier than expected. This makes us think that our probability of piloting in Malawi is better than even, around 60%.
3. Good question. This intervention has the potential to have very large-scale benefits, and very high cost-effectiveness, but I don’t think I could attach a reasonable probability estimate that I’d trust this far out.
In super simple terms, how does lobbying work for one of these countries? Is it as simple as getting the phone with a local politician and going from there?
Hi Linch, Great question. Probability estimates about the future are always difficult—we can give you some loose indications of what we expect, though these should be taken with a grain of salt.
1. A two month timeline may be hard to estimate, as things can often run more slowly when starting in a new country. However, we can give more confident estimates on a three month timeline (which offers some buffer room).
We’d attach a reasonably high probability to having enough information to make these decisions within the next 3 months (~80%). Our decision-relevant data gaps at the moment are a) about the level of lead paint use in Malawi, and b) about the tractability of meeting with Malawian politicians. However, we have ways to test both of these things, and identify whether they should be a disqualifying factor, and have strong leads on the connections required to get this information.
2. Our probability of piloting in Malawi is also quite high, as the early indicators of burden and tractability seem quite strong. We’ve managed to find a 2017 study on the level of lead in paint in Malawi which indicates that this country would be highly promising to target. The study found that 56% of paint tested in Malawi had more than 90ppm, and 37.5% had more than 600ppm - this makes us think that it is quite likely that lead is a significant contributor to the overall burden of lead poisoning in Malawi. On the tractability side, making contacts within Malawi has also been much easier than expected. This makes us think that our probability of piloting in Malawi is better than even, around 60%.
3. Good question. This intervention has the potential to have very large-scale benefits, and very high cost-effectiveness, but I don’t think I could attach a reasonable probability estimate that I’d trust this far out.
In super simple terms, how does lobbying work for one of these countries? Is it as simple as getting the phone with a local politician and going from there?