I think this post uses the term “Pascal’s mugging” incorrectly, and I’ve seen this mistake frequently so I thought I’d leave a comment.
Pascal’s mugging refers to scenarios with tiny probabilities (less than 1 in a trillion or so) of vast utilities (potentially higher than the largest utopia/dystopia that could be achieved in the reachable universe), and presents a decision-theoretic problem. Some discussion in Tiny Probabilities of Vast Utilities: A Problem for Long-Termism? and Pascal’s Muggle: Infinitesimal Priors and Strong Evidence. Quoting from the first of those pieces:
Yet it would also be naive to say things like “Long-termists are victims of Pascal’s Mugging.”
I think the correct term for the issue you’re describing might be something like “cause robustness” or “conjunctive arguments” or similar.
I think this post uses the term “Pascal’s mugging” incorrectly, and I’ve seen this mistake frequently so I thought I’d leave a comment.
Pascal’s mugging refers to scenarios with tiny probabilities (less than 1 in a trillion or so) of vast utilities (potentially higher than the largest utopia/dystopia that could be achieved in the reachable universe), and presents a decision-theoretic problem. Some discussion in Tiny Probabilities of Vast Utilities: A Problem for Long-Termism? and Pascal’s Muggle: Infinitesimal Priors and Strong Evidence. Quoting from the first of those pieces:
I think the correct term for the issue you’re describing might be something like “cause robustness” or “conjunctive arguments” or similar.