Arguably we can only say a world state X is âbetterâ than a world state Y iff both
switching from X to Y is bad and
switching from Y to X is good.
FWIW, people with person-affecting views would ask âbetter for whom?â. Each set of people could have their own betterness order. Person-affecting views basically try to navigate these different possible betterness orders.
But it doesnât seem to matter whether X or Y (or neither) is actually current, everyone should be able to agree whether, e.g., âswitching from X to Y is badâ is true or not. The switch choices always hypothetically assume that the first world (in this case X) is current, because thatâs where the potential choice to switch is made.
Between A and Z, the people in A are much better off in A, and the extra people in Z are much better off in Z (they get to exist, with positive lives). It seems like theyâd disagree about switching, if everyone only considers the impact on their own welfare.
(Their welfare levels could also be the degree of satisfaction of their impartial or partially other-regarding preferences, but say they have different impartial preferences.)
Switching from A to Z means that A is current when the decision to switch or not switch is made. So the additional people in Z donât exist and are not impacted if the switch isnât made. Even if Z is current, people in Z can still evaluate whether switching from A to Z is good (= would have been good), since this just means âassuming A is current, is it good to switch to Z?â. Even if Z is in fact current, the people in Z can still agree that, if A had been current, a switch to Z should not have been made. Intuitions to the contrary seem to mistake âI should not have existedâ for âI should not existâ. The former can be true while the latter is false.
They can agree, but they need not. Again, if everyone were purely selfish, it seems like they would disagree. The extra people would prefer to exist, given their positive welfare levels. The original people would prefer the extra not to exist, if itâs paired with a loss to their own welfare. Or, if we took the perspectives of whatâs best for each personâs personal/âselfish welfare on their behalf, weâd have those two groups of perspectives.
And we can probably rig up a version thatâs other-regarding for the people, say the extra people are total utilitarians, and the original people have person-affecting views.
It makes sense to want to keep existing if you already exist. But believing that it would have been bad, had you never existed in the first place, is a different matter. For whom would it have been bad? Apparently for nobody.
I can, now that I exist, assign myself welfare level 0 in the counterfactuals in which I was never born. I can also assign welfare level 0 to potential people who donât come to exist.
People talk about being grateful to have been born. One way to make sense of this is that they compare to a counterfactual in which they were never born. Or maybe itâs just adding up the good and bad in their life and judging thereâs more good than bad. But then an âempty lifeâ, with no goods or bads, would be net 0, and you could equate that with nonexistence.
On some interpretations of the total view, it can be worse for someone to not be born even if they havenât been conceived yet, and even if they never will be.
Personally, I roughly agree with your intuition here, but it might need to be made into a âwideâ version, in light of the nonidentity problem. And my views are also asymmetric.
FWIW, people with person-affecting views would ask âbetter for whom?â. Each set of people could have their own betterness order. Person-affecting views basically try to navigate these different possible betterness orders.
But it doesnât seem to matter whether X or Y (or neither) is actually current, everyone should be able to agree whether, e.g., âswitching from X to Y is badâ is true or not. The switch choices always hypothetically assume that the first world (in this case X) is current, because thatâs where the potential choice to switch is made.
Between A and Z, the people in A are much better off in A, and the extra people in Z are much better off in Z (they get to exist, with positive lives). It seems like theyâd disagree about switching, if everyone only considers the impact on their own welfare.
(Their welfare levels could also be the degree of satisfaction of their impartial or partially other-regarding preferences, but say they have different impartial preferences.)
Switching from A to Z means that A is current when the decision to switch or not switch is made. So the additional people in Z donât exist and are not impacted if the switch isnât made. Even if Z is current, people in Z can still evaluate whether switching from A to Z is good (= would have been good), since this just means âassuming A is current, is it good to switch to Z?â. Even if Z is in fact current, the people in Z can still agree that, if A had been current, a switch to Z should not have been made. Intuitions to the contrary seem to mistake âI should not have existedâ for âI should not existâ. The former can be true while the latter is false.
They can agree, but they need not. Again, if everyone were purely selfish, it seems like they would disagree. The extra people would prefer to exist, given their positive welfare levels. The original people would prefer the extra not to exist, if itâs paired with a loss to their own welfare. Or, if we took the perspectives of whatâs best for each personâs personal/âselfish welfare on their behalf, weâd have those two groups of perspectives.
And we can probably rig up a version thatâs other-regarding for the people, say the extra people are total utilitarians, and the original people have person-affecting views.
It makes sense to want to keep existing if you already exist. But believing that it would have been bad, had you never existed in the first place, is a different matter. For whom would it have been bad? Apparently for nobody.
Thatâs a person-affecting intuition.
I can, now that I exist, assign myself welfare level 0 in the counterfactuals in which I was never born. I can also assign welfare level 0 to potential people who donât come to exist.
People talk about being grateful to have been born. One way to make sense of this is that they compare to a counterfactual in which they were never born. Or maybe itâs just adding up the good and bad in their life and judging thereâs more good than bad. But then an âempty lifeâ, with no goods or bads, would be net 0, and you could equate that with nonexistence.
On some interpretations of the total view, it can be worse for someone to not be born even if they havenât been conceived yet, and even if they never will be.
Personally, I roughly agree with your intuition here, but it might need to be made into a âwideâ version, in light of the nonidentity problem. And my views are also asymmetric.