It seems important to remember that even if high status (for lack of a more neutrally-valenced term) longtermist interventions like AI safety aren’t currently “funding constrained,” animal welfare at large most definitely is. As just one clear example, an ACE report from few months ago estimated that Faunalytics has room for more than $1m in funding.
That means there remains a very high (in absolute terms) opportunity cost to longtermist spending, because each dollar spent is one not being donated to an animal welfare org. This doesn’t make liberal longtermist spending wrong, but it does make it costly in terms of expected nearterm suffering.
This is the main reason big longtermist spending gives me pause, even though I just about entirely buy the longtermist thesis. EA is, by and large, pretty good at giving due concern to non-salient opportunity costs, but this seems to be an area in which we’re falling short.
even though I just about entirely buy the longtermist thesis
If you buy into the longtermist thesis why are you privileging the opportunity cost of giving to longtermist causes and not the opportunity cost of giving to animal welfare?
Are you simply saying you think the marginal value of more money to animal welfare is greater than to longtermist causes?
I’m not intending to, although it’s possible I’m using the term “opportunity cost” incorrectly or in a different way than you. The opportunity cost of giving a dollar to animal welfare is indeed whatever that dollar could have bought in the longtermist space (or whatever else you think is the next best option).
However, it seems to me that at least some parts of longtermist EA , some of the time, to some extent, disregard the animal suffering opportunity cost almost entirely. Surely the same error is committed in the opposite direction by hardcore animal advocates, but the asymmetry comes from the fact that this latter group controls a way smaller share of financial pie.
However, it seems to me that at least some parts of longtermist EA , some of the time, to some extent, disregard the animal suffering opportunity cost almost entirely.
I’m not sure how you come to this conclusion, or even what it would mean to “disregard the opportunity cost”.
Longtermist EAs generally know their money could go towards reducing animal suffering and do good. They know and generally acknowledge that there is an opportunity cost of giving to longtermist causes. They simply think their money could do the most good if given to longtermist causes.
Are you simply saying you think the marginal value of more money to animal welfare is greater than to longtermist causes?
Note that with diminishing returns, marginal utility per dollar (MU/$) is a function of the level of spending. So it could be the case that the MU/$ for the next $1M to Faunalytics is really high, but drops off above $1M. So I would rephrase your question as:
>do you think the marginal value of more money to animal welfare right now is greater than to longtermist causes?
Related to the funding point (note 4):
It seems important to remember that even if high status (for lack of a more neutrally-valenced term) longtermist interventions like AI safety aren’t currently “funding constrained,” animal welfare at large most definitely is. As just one clear example, an ACE report from few months ago estimated that Faunalytics has room for more than $1m in funding.
That means there remains a very high (in absolute terms) opportunity cost to longtermist spending, because each dollar spent is one not being donated to an animal welfare org. This doesn’t make liberal longtermist spending wrong, but it does make it costly in terms of expected nearterm suffering.
This is the main reason big longtermist spending gives me pause, even though I just about entirely buy the longtermist thesis. EA is, by and large, pretty good at giving due concern to non-salient opportunity costs, but this seems to be an area in which we’re falling short.
If you buy into the longtermist thesis why are you privileging the opportunity cost of giving to longtermist causes and not the opportunity cost of giving to animal welfare?
Are you simply saying you think the marginal value of more money to animal welfare is greater than to longtermist causes?
I’m not intending to, although it’s possible I’m using the term “opportunity cost” incorrectly or in a different way than you. The opportunity cost of giving a dollar to animal welfare is indeed whatever that dollar could have bought in the longtermist space (or whatever else you think is the next best option).
However, it seems to me that at least some parts of longtermist EA , some of the time, to some extent, disregard the animal suffering opportunity cost almost entirely. Surely the same error is committed in the opposite direction by hardcore animal advocates, but the asymmetry comes from the fact that this latter group controls a way smaller share of financial pie.
I’m not sure how you come to this conclusion, or even what it would mean to “disregard the opportunity cost”.
Longtermist EAs generally know their money could go towards reducing animal suffering and do good. They know and generally acknowledge that there is an opportunity cost of giving to longtermist causes. They simply think their money could do the most good if given to longtermist causes.
Note that with diminishing returns, marginal utility per dollar (MU/$) is a function of the level of spending. So it could be the case that the MU/$ for the next $1M to Faunalytics is really high, but drops off above $1M. So I would rephrase your question as:
>do you think the marginal value of more money to animal welfare right now is greater than to longtermist causes?