Executive summary: Cosmic NIMBYs, who prefer a smaller future with higher average welfare, could greatly limit the value of the future according to total utilitarianism, but there are reasons to believe a larger future may not necessarily reduce average welfare.
Key points:
Cosmic NIMBYs are people who prefer a smaller future with fewer people to maintain higher welfare for existing people, analogous to traditional NIMBYs opposing local development.
If cosmic NIMBYs are successful, it could greatly reduce the value of the future according to total utilitarianism and scope-sensitive axiologies.
The repugnant conclusion suggests a possible tradeoff between a large future and high average welfare, but there are also reasons a larger future may not reduce average welfare.
Longtermist implications include supporting pro-expansion space policies, focusing on making the future large in addition to reducing existential risk, and navigating the tension between advocating for expansion versus enabling a Molochian future.
More thinking is needed to avoid the failure modes of a future that is either too small with high average welfare or too large with near-zero average welfare.
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Executive summary: Cosmic NIMBYs, who prefer a smaller future with higher average welfare, could greatly limit the value of the future according to total utilitarianism, but there are reasons to believe a larger future may not necessarily reduce average welfare.
Key points:
Cosmic NIMBYs are people who prefer a smaller future with fewer people to maintain higher welfare for existing people, analogous to traditional NIMBYs opposing local development.
If cosmic NIMBYs are successful, it could greatly reduce the value of the future according to total utilitarianism and scope-sensitive axiologies.
The repugnant conclusion suggests a possible tradeoff between a large future and high average welfare, but there are also reasons a larger future may not reduce average welfare.
Longtermist implications include supporting pro-expansion space policies, focusing on making the future large in addition to reducing existential risk, and navigating the tension between advocating for expansion versus enabling a Molochian future.
More thinking is needed to avoid the failure modes of a future that is either too small with high average welfare or too large with near-zero average welfare.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.