What are the safest (i.e., most backfire-proof)[1] consensual EAA interventions? (overlaps with #3.c and may require #6.)
How should we compare their cost-effectiveness to that of interventions that require something like spotlighting or bracketing (or more thereof) to be considered positive?[2] (may require A.)
Robust ways to reduce wild animal suffering
New/underrated arguments regarding whether reducing some wild animal populations is good for wild animals (a brief overview of the academic debate so far here).
Consensual ways of affecting the size of some wild animal populations (contingent planning that might become relevant depending on results from the above kind of research).
How do these and the safest consensual EAA interventions (see 1) interact?
Evaluating the backfire risks of different welfare reforms for farmed insects, shrimp, fish, or chickens (see DiGiovanni 2025).
Other things related to deep uncertainty in animal welfare (see DiGiovanni 2025 and Graham 2025 for context).
Red-teaming the cost-effectiveness analyses made by key actors on different animal welfare interventions (especially those relevant to anything listed above).
More fundamental philosophical or psychological stuff relevant to cause prio:
A) Under cluelessness, what forms of bracketing[3] (or different solutions) make most sense to guide our actions?
B) New/underrated arguments for being particularly worried about the suffering of sentient beings (rather than about pleasure or other things).
C) What explains the fact that some EA animal advocates buy suffering-focused ethics and others don’t? What are the cruxes? What persuaded them? Are there social backgrounds that determine someone’s degree of (non-)sympathy for suffering-focused ethics?
D) How to avoid reducing the credibility of any of the (fairly niche) kinds of work in these two lists?
How do we anticipate very understandable reactions like this one when talking about nematodes and/or indirect effects on wild animals? (e.g., how do we make clear what this work implies and does not imply?)
Yup, something a variety of views can get behind. E.g., not “buying beef”.
For “consensual EAA interventions” above, I think I was thinking more “not something EAs see as ineffective like welfare reforms for circus animals”. If this turned out to be the safest animal intervention, I suspect this wouldn’t convince many EAs to consider it. But if, say, developing alternatives to rodents as snake food turned out to be very safe, this could weigh a lot in its favor for them.
An informal research agenda on robust animal welfare interventions and adjacent cause prioritization questions
Context: As I started filling out this expression of interest form to be a mentor for Sentient Futures’ project incubator program, I came up with the following list of topics I might be interested in mentoring. And I thought it was worth sharing here. :) (Feedback welcome!)
Animal-welfare-related research/work:
What are the safest (i.e., most backfire-proof)[1] consensual EAA interventions? (overlaps with #3.c and may require #6.)
How should we compare their cost-effectiveness to that of interventions that require something like spotlighting or bracketing (or more thereof) to be considered positive?[2] (may require A.)
Robust ways to reduce wild animal suffering
New/underrated arguments regarding whether reducing some wild animal populations is good for wild animals (a brief overview of the academic debate so far here).
Consensual ways of affecting the size of some wild animal populations (contingent planning that might become relevant depending on results from the above kind of research).
How do these and the safest consensual EAA interventions (see 1) interact?
Preventing the off-Earth replication of wild ecosystems.
Uncertainty on moral weights (some relevant context in this comment thread).
Red-teaming of different moral weights that have been explicitly proposed and defended (by Rethink Priorities, Vasco Grilo, …).
How and how much do cluelessness arguments apply to moral weights and inter-species tradeoffs?
What actions are robust to severe uncertainty about inter-species tradeoffs? (overlaps with #1.)
Considerations regarding the impact of saving human lives (c.f. top-GiveWell charities) on farmed and wild animals. (may require 3 and 5.)
The impact of agriculture on soil nematodes and other numerous soil animals, in terms of total population.
Evaluating the backfire risks of different welfare reforms for farmed insects, shrimp, fish, or chickens (see DiGiovanni 2025).
Other things related to deep uncertainty in animal welfare (see DiGiovanni 2025 and Graham 2025 for context).
Red-teaming the cost-effectiveness analyses made by key actors on different animal welfare interventions (especially those relevant to anything listed above).
More fundamental philosophical or psychological stuff relevant to cause prio:
A) Under cluelessness, what forms of bracketing[3] (or different solutions) make most sense to guide our actions?
B) New/underrated arguments for being particularly worried about the suffering of sentient beings (rather than about pleasure or other things).
C) What explains the fact that some EA animal advocates buy suffering-focused ethics and others don’t? What are the cruxes? What persuaded them? Are there social backgrounds that determine someone’s degree of (non-)sympathy for suffering-focused ethics?
D) How to avoid reducing the credibility of any of the (fairly niche) kinds of work in these two lists?
How do we anticipate very understandable reactions like this one when talking about nematodes and/or indirect effects on wild animals? (e.g., how do we make clear what this work implies and does not imply?)
I.e., most ecologically inert, and most avoidant of substitution effects, funging, and other backfire risks.
See the last paragraph of this post section from Graham and this comment from Stevenson. This post section from DiGiovanni on an adjacent topic is also indirectly relevant.
Some challenges to consequentialist bracketing:
- defining a good criterion regarding what value locations get to be bracketed in.
- what are these value locations? What’s the unit?
- is doing what is optimal under bracketing better than doing something with a smaller impact but robustly good?
Some challenges to metanormative bracketing:
- potential sensitivity to the individuation of normative views.
- are normative views even non-arbitary units to bracket over?
What does “consensual” mean here (and to some extent above)? Consensual on the part of humans/institutions?
Yup, something a variety of views can get behind. E.g., not “buying beef”.
For “consensual EAA interventions” above, I think I was thinking more “not something EAs see as ineffective like welfare reforms for circus animals”. If this turned out to be the safest animal intervention, I suspect this wouldn’t convince many EAs to consider it. But if, say, developing alternatives to rodents as snake food turned out to be very safe, this could weigh a lot in its favor for them.
Thanks for sharing, Jim!
Nitpick. Vasco Grilo.
Damn, a friend just made me realize that I had mispelled your first name too. So sorry aha
No worries!
Aha oops very sorry, fixed ;)