Because Alice told Bob that she still aims to do as much good as she can, I thought she might have answered this question differently:
Bob: [ . . . ] At the same time, it’s a real possibility [that disengaging from the Forum and no longer meeting EAs at conferences would reduce your impact]. Do you have a specific reason to believe [that]’s wrong?
Alice: Nope, and I’m comfortable with that.
I imagined that someone in Alice’s position might instead have said something like:
I think it’s unclear how disengaging will affect my impact, but my guess right now is that the effect will be positive, not negative. Being highly engaged with EA takes up finite resources like time, attention, and emotional energy that I could be using to explore other communities and ways of doing as much good as I can. I’m still planning to seek out spaces where I can share ideas and coordinate with people who aim to make a positive difference in the world. They just won’t be EA spaces anymore, because I’m no longer confident that those are the specific spaces where I can do the most good.
I thought this point might be important because it suggests how high the bar is for a community that aspires to do good by attracting and retaining impact-motivated people: Even if the community creates the right kinds of spaces and has the right aims, people like Alice are likely to disengage unless, in practice, staying involved seems to be the best possible use of their limited time and other resources.
I wanted Alice’s response to capture a resistance to moral blackmail that I think is important to have. I personally could not make a tight philosophical defense in my head for why leaving EA is actually impact maximizing, but I am also more committed to resisting moral blackmail than I am to giving tight philosophical defenses of my beliefs. But I think your point makes total sense.
Maybe moral blackmail is too harsh of a term. But I think that it is important to feel like you can leave without violating your moral commitments. That doesn’t in any way mean that Bob is wrong or trying to commit moral blackmail.
Because Alice told Bob that she still aims to do as much good as she can, I thought she might have answered this question differently:
I imagined that someone in Alice’s position might instead have said something like:
I thought this point might be important because it suggests how high the bar is for a community that aspires to do good by attracting and retaining impact-motivated people: Even if the community creates the right kinds of spaces and has the right aims, people like Alice are likely to disengage unless, in practice, staying involved seems to be the best possible use of their limited time and other resources.
(I really appreciated this post. Thank you!)
I wanted Alice’s response to capture a resistance to moral blackmail that I think is important to have. I personally could not make a tight philosophical defense in my head for why leaving EA is actually impact maximizing, but I am also more committed to resisting moral blackmail than I am to giving tight philosophical defenses of my beliefs. But I think your point makes total sense.
Do you see Bob’s question as moral blackmail? I feel like it ta a reasonable question to ask l, but maybe I’m missing something
Maybe moral blackmail is too harsh of a term. But I think that it is important to feel like you can leave without violating your moral commitments. That doesn’t in any way mean that Bob is wrong or trying to commit moral blackmail.