It’s not a consensus but none of the authors/researchers who I would.expect to argue this actually do expect the expected amount of animal suffering to outweigh the amount of animal flourishing in the long run. On the other hand, dozens of prominent researchers including Shulman, Beckstead, Wiblin and Bostrom, many of whom are hard-nosed utilitarians, have come to conclude the opposite.
What I’m looking for in a credible assessment of this question is for people to think about what kinds of worlds we might see. Then the trick is to focus not on the worlds with a particular salient scenario in them, but the ones that are most durable, with large scope and large populstion. Such worlds will be outliers in the sense that they are not natural anymore, we might live much longer, there may not be a meaningful category of a “human” anymore. There may no-longer be multiple living entities anymore but perhaps just one. Or there may be much better ways to understand the experiences of other beings. We may have a very different approach to morality. It may be possible to create accurate models of a being without simulating their emotions. We may have a better understanding of the mechanics of emotions. Et cetera et cetera.
That kind of thinking, sharpened with an empirical approach that takes note of past improvements in technology and welfare, is needed to thoroughly investigate this issue, not a “single issue” presumption about a topic to one’s personal interests, however interesting that topic may seem.
The fact that their analyses include a wide range of topics, rather than focusing on confirming and emphasising specific hypotheses is encouraging, and the fact that a large number of credible people have arrived at similar conclusions from widely varying perspectives is the best possible sign.
It’s not a consensus but none of the authors/researchers who I would.expect to argue this actually do expect the expected amount of animal suffering to outweigh the amount of animal flourishing in the long run. On the other hand, dozens of prominent researchers including Shulman, Beckstead, Wiblin and Bostrom, many of whom are hard-nosed utilitarians, have come to conclude the opposite.
What I’m looking for in a credible assessment of this question is for people to think about what kinds of worlds we might see. Then the trick is to focus not on the worlds with a particular salient scenario in them, but the ones that are most durable, with large scope and large populstion. Such worlds will be outliers in the sense that they are not natural anymore, we might live much longer, there may not be a meaningful category of a “human” anymore. There may no-longer be multiple living entities anymore but perhaps just one. Or there may be much better ways to understand the experiences of other beings. We may have a very different approach to morality. It may be possible to create accurate models of a being without simulating their emotions. We may have a better understanding of the mechanics of emotions. Et cetera et cetera.
That kind of thinking, sharpened with an empirical approach that takes note of past improvements in technology and welfare, is needed to thoroughly investigate this issue, not a “single issue” presumption about a topic to one’s personal interests, however interesting that topic may seem.
Nick Bostrom et al. could be affected by confirmation bias and optimism bias.
The fact that their analyses include a wide range of topics, rather than focusing on confirming and emphasising specific hypotheses is encouraging, and the fact that a large number of credible people have arrived at similar conclusions from widely varying perspectives is the best possible sign.