I believe in a symmetry for people who already exist, but I also think empirically that many common sources of suffering are far worse than the common sources of happiness are good. For people who don’t exist, I don’t see how creating more happy people is good. The absence of happiness is not bad. This is where I think there is an asymmetry.
I don’t even understand what it would mean for an ethical theory to be correct. Does that mean it is hardwired into the physical constants of the universe? I guess I’m sort of a non-cognitivist.
Right, but is that for sources of happiness and suffering that are common among all people who will exist across all time? Because almost all of the people who will exist (irrespective of your actions) don’t currently.
There’s a difficulty that I guess you’d be sensitive to, in that it’s hard to distinguish the absence of happiness from the presence of suffering and vice versa. The difference between the two is not hardwired into the physical constants of the universe, if that is a phrasing that you might be sympathetic to, though no snark is intended.
If you’re non-cognitivist, then you could ask whether you “should” (even rationally or egoistically) act according to your moral perspective. If you choose to live out your values by some description, for some reason, then they’re not going to be purely represented by any ethical theory anyway, and it’d be unclear to me why you’d want to simplify your intuitions in that way.
If you don’t have a child, you are not decreasing your nonexistent offspring’s welfare/preference satisfaction. Beings who do not exist do not have preferences and cannot suffer. Once they exist (and become sentient), their preferences and welfare matter. This may not be hardcoded into the universe, but it’s not hard to distinguish between having a child and not having one.
I meant within one person. If you believe that there is a fundamental difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal comparisons, then you’re going to run into a wall trying to define persons… It doesn’t seem to me that this really checks out, putting aside the question of why one would want simple answers here as a non-cognitivist.
I believe in a symmetry for people who already exist, but I also think empirically that many common sources of suffering are far worse than the common sources of happiness are good. For people who don’t exist, I don’t see how creating more happy people is good. The absence of happiness is not bad. This is where I think there is an asymmetry.
I don’t even understand what it would mean for an ethical theory to be correct. Does that mean it is hardwired into the physical constants of the universe? I guess I’m sort of a non-cognitivist.
Right, but is that for sources of happiness and suffering that are common among all people who will exist across all time? Because almost all of the people who will exist (irrespective of your actions) don’t currently.
There’s a difficulty that I guess you’d be sensitive to, in that it’s hard to distinguish the absence of happiness from the presence of suffering and vice versa. The difference between the two is not hardwired into the physical constants of the universe, if that is a phrasing that you might be sympathetic to, though no snark is intended.
If you’re non-cognitivist, then you could ask whether you “should” (even rationally or egoistically) act according to your moral perspective. If you choose to live out your values by some description, for some reason, then they’re not going to be purely represented by any ethical theory anyway, and it’d be unclear to me why you’d want to simplify your intuitions in that way.
If you don’t have a child, you are not decreasing your nonexistent offspring’s welfare/preference satisfaction. Beings who do not exist do not have preferences and cannot suffer. Once they exist (and become sentient), their preferences and welfare matter. This may not be hardcoded into the universe, but it’s not hard to distinguish between having a child and not having one.
I meant within one person. If you believe that there is a fundamental difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal comparisons, then you’re going to run into a wall trying to define persons… It doesn’t seem to me that this really checks out, putting aside the question of why one would want simple answers here as a non-cognitivist.