One important caveat seems to me that the falsity of computational functionalism would not imply that AI consciousness is impossible. You could have some other functionalist view that allows that many different substrates may realize consciousness, or perhaps think that multiple realizability can be cashed out in a non-functionalist way or is just primitive.
I agree with this. Computational functionalism is the main way researchers/practitioners are operationalising AI consciousness in practice today, but philosophically there are several other possibilities. Dualisms and panpsychisms would often fit the bill too. In both cases, there’s the challenge of identifying whether the consciousness is operating at the level of a particular system, as opposed to specific components/subfunctions within it or indeed a broader system that subsumes it. Functional approaches might have easier ways of handling that challenge, but it still needs setting out.
One important caveat seems to me that the falsity of computational functionalism would not imply that AI consciousness is impossible. You could have some other functionalist view that allows that many different substrates may realize consciousness, or perhaps think that multiple realizability can be cashed out in a non-functionalist way or is just primitive.
I agree with this. Computational functionalism is the main way researchers/practitioners are operationalising AI consciousness in practice today, but philosophically there are several other possibilities. Dualisms and panpsychisms would often fit the bill too. In both cases, there’s the challenge of identifying whether the consciousness is operating at the level of a particular system, as opposed to specific components/subfunctions within it or indeed a broader system that subsumes it. Functional approaches might have easier ways of handling that challenge, but it still needs setting out.