Thanks for taking a look! The tricky thing is there’s a strong case against most positions in philosophy of mind… Eric Schwitzgebel has called the field ‘crazyist’, a bit like QM, on the basis that there are multiple possible positions, each with bizarre implications, but where reason does not (yet) compel us to a single one. But for sure, computational functionalism has some major challenges facing it that are often ignored or poorly addressed, and those challenges can lead to putting a low probability estimate on it...
That makes sense. Can I crosspost to the EA Forum arguments from Computational Functionalism Debate (linking to this post too)? I would like to share the Pen & Paper Argument, which is among the ones against CF which I find most persuasive.
Thanks for taking a look! The tricky thing is there’s a strong case against most positions in philosophy of mind… Eric Schwitzgebel has called the field ‘crazyist’, a bit like QM, on the basis that there are multiple possible positions, each with bizarre implications, but where reason does not (yet) compel us to a single one. But for sure, computational functionalism has some major challenges facing it that are often ignored or poorly addressed, and those challenges can lead to putting a low probability estimate on it...
That makes sense. Can I crosspost to the EA Forum arguments from Computational Functionalism Debate (linking to this post too)? I would like to share the Pen & Paper Argument, which is among the ones against CF which I find most persuasive.
Please go ahead—I’m glad it’s proving useful
Published.