We don’t want to allow just any arbitrary gerrymandered states to count as an adequate implementation of consciousness’s functional roles
maybe the neurons printed on each page aren’t doing enough causal work in generating the next edition
I agree with the way you’ve formulated the problem, and the possible solution—I’m guessing that an adequate theory of implementation deals with both of them. Some condition about there being the right kind of “reliable, counterfactual-supporting connection between the states” (that quote is from Chalmers’ take on these issues).
But I have not yet figured out how to think about these things to my satisfaction.
Thanks for the comment! I agree with the thrust of this comment.
Learning more and thinking more clearly about implementation of computation in general and neural computation in particular, is perennially on my intellectual to-do list list.
I agree with the way you’ve formulated the problem, and the possible solution—I’m guessing that an adequate theory of implementation deals with both of them. Some condition about there being the right kind of “reliable, counterfactual-supporting connection between the states” (that quote is from Chalmers’ take on these issues).
But I have not yet figured out how to think about these things to my satisfaction.