I chose to use critical-level utilitarianism because it’s very general; total utilitarianism, number-dampened utilitarianism, and average utilitarianism are all equivalent for small changes if you use the right critical level.
Yes, it’s some consolation that CLU is a family of standards that includes standard TU.
Actually, I think that facilitating moral trade is a major advantage of using a “critical level”. The “utility-maximizing” compromise between two altruists who disagree on the critical level is to take the average of the levels.
Yep, the concern here is that we would get into that situation in the first place. I’m interested in finding ways to avoid having some optimistic altruists strong advocating for greatly increased population and pessimists advocating for greatly decreased population in the first place. Of course, not discussing population is not an entirely satisfactory solution so perhaps we should just try to emphasise harmony more.
Thanks. Sorry if this post was too aggressive—I didn’t mean to strongly advocate a single theory; I just wanted to discuss something other than “which theory is correct?”, and this topic seemed like the best choice. I’d like to write more articles about how population changes can be evaluated, so I’m wondering where to go next. Here’s what I can think of:
Don’t bother: There’s not enough agreement on population ethics for it to be worth discussing at all.
Be more abstract: Talking about population-ethical theories is more productive than I think it is, and I should focus on exploring a broader range of theories. I could write a post introducing the basic concepts and explain how they’re relevant to effective altruism.
Using a different theory: The most popular theory (which one?) isn’t compatible with a critical level, so I should focus on implications of that one.
Change my assumptions slightly: I could estimate individual’s utility differently (like use HDI instead of GDP), or value population changes somewhat differently.
Continue with this: Go into more detail, do more realistic calculations, and justify my assumptions better.
I don’t think you fell into a trap of appearing aggressive or being a narrow-minded advocate of one theory. It was also a good post and had some interesting conclusions. I just think there are some traps in nearby areas, relating to upsetting altruists who have more optimistic or pessimist views, or being divisive, which—if you want—you can ward against by privately circulating any potentially controversial draft. From your options, 1,4 and 5 seem fine. 3 seems especially useful. Rather than take this approach: “Throughout this article, I’ll assume you agree with Broome’s article”, it might be better to try to perform at least some small amount of synthesis of different views. For instance, some standard (and useful) caveats for a CLU analysis would be that:
CLU has some unintuitive conclusions (sadistic conclusion)
people’s preferences for living or procreating may give reasons for letting people do these things
prioritarianism or Rawlsian justice based views may encourage you to care more about improving the lives of those who are worst-off
Yes, it’s some consolation that CLU is a family of standards that includes standard TU.
Yep, the concern here is that we would get into that situation in the first place. I’m interested in finding ways to avoid having some optimistic altruists strong advocating for greatly increased population and pessimists advocating for greatly decreased population in the first place. Of course, not discussing population is not an entirely satisfactory solution so perhaps we should just try to emphasise harmony more.
I don’t think you fell into a trap of appearing aggressive or being a narrow-minded advocate of one theory. It was also a good post and had some interesting conclusions. I just think there are some traps in nearby areas, relating to upsetting altruists who have more optimistic or pessimist views, or being divisive, which—if you want—you can ward against by privately circulating any potentially controversial draft. From your options, 1,4 and 5 seem fine. 3 seems especially useful. Rather than take this approach: “Throughout this article, I’ll assume you agree with Broome’s article”, it might be better to try to perform at least some small amount of synthesis of different views. For instance, some standard (and useful) caveats for a CLU analysis would be that:
CLU has some unintuitive conclusions (sadistic conclusion)
people’s preferences for living or procreating may give reasons for letting people do these things
prioritarianism or Rawlsian justice based views may encourage you to care more about improving the lives of those who are worst-off