Neat post! I wasn’t previously aware of Korsgaard’s argument against Parfit, but it strikes me as very resonant with a pragmatic (Madhyamaka) Buddhist response to the non-existence of the Self. As Jay Garfield writes in Freedom, Agency and Ethics for Madhyamikas about the possibility of moral responsibility without “free will”:
For a Madhyamika, we have noted, our selves are constructed. They are constructed through the appropriation of aggregates, through recognizing a body as mine, thoughts as mine, values, dispositions, and intentions as mine. In turn, those physical and cognitive processes are also constructed in relation to that self, and it is appropriated by them. That appropriation and narration of a life is, moreover, not a solo affair. We narrate and construct each other constantly in the hermeneutical ensemble act that is social life. [...]
What is it to act? As we noted above, it is for our behavior to be determined by reasons, by motives we and/or others, regard as our own. On a Madhyamaka understanding, it is therefore for the causes of our behavior to be part of the narrative that makes sense of our lives, as opposed to being simply part of the vast uninterpreted milieu in which our lives are led, or bits of the narratives that more properly constitute the lives of others. This distinction is not a metaphysical but a literary distinction, and so a matter of choice, and sensitive to explanatory purposes. That sensitivity, on the other hand, means that the choice is not arbitrary. We can follow Nietzsche here. For what do we take responsibility and for what are we assigned responsibility? Those acts we interpret—or which others interpret for us—as our own, as constituting part of the basis of imputation of our own identities. [...]
From this perspective, a choice occurs when we experience competing motives, consider alternative reasons, some of which could, if dominant, occasion alternative actions, and one set of reasons dominates, causing the action, and caused to cause the action by our background psychological dispositions and other cognitive and conative states. Some actions are expressive of and conducive to virtue, happiness, liberation and the welfare of others and merit praise; others are not. But there need be no more to moral assessment than that. Everything that the post-Augustinian libertarian West buys with the gold coin of the freedom of the will along with all of the metaphysical problems it raises, are bought by the Madhyamika much more cheaply with the paper currency of mere imputation.
I thought I’d share this because Parfit’s arguments against personal identity are often viewed as analogues to Buddhist metaphysical arguments against the Self, both of which are often taken to imply something like utilitarianism. (I used to believe something like this!)
But as the above passages highlight, anti-realism about Selves can co-exist with pragmatic fictionalism (what Madhyamaka Buddists call “conventional truth”) about Selves, and so it still makes plenty of sense to talk about “persons”, as long as we recognize that the concept of personhood (like all other concepts) are mere conventions (or so Madhyamaka Buddhists argue).
Also, regarding persuading non-consequentialists on their own terms, I’ve long been meaning to write a post (tentatively) titled “Judicious Duty: Effective Altruism for Non-Consquentialists”, so this is giving me additional motivation to eventually do so :)
Wow that’s a fascinating connection/parallel – thank you so much for sharing! Anything else you’d recommend reading in that literature? Am very curious about any other similarities between Madhyamaka Buddhism and Kantian thought
Also, regarding persuading non-consequentialists on their own terms, I’ve long been meaning to write a post (tentatively) titled “Judicious Duty: Effective Altruism for Non-Consquentialists”, so this is giving me additional motivation to eventually do so :)
That sounds super interesting – definitely write it! If you ever want someone to read a draft or something, shoot me a dm!
Welcome! To be clear, I do think that Buddhist thought and Kantian thought are more often at odds than in alignment. It’s just that Garfield’s more careful analysis of the No-Self argument suggests that accepting the emptiness of “Self” doesn’t mean doing away with personhood-related concepts like moral responsibility.
That said, you might be interested in Dan Arnold’s Brains, Buddhas and Believing, which does try to interpret arguments from the Madhyamaka school as similar to contemporary Kantian critiques against reductionism about the mind.
Neat post! I wasn’t previously aware of Korsgaard’s argument against Parfit, but it strikes me as very resonant with a pragmatic (Madhyamaka) Buddhist response to the non-existence of the Self. As Jay Garfield writes in Freedom, Agency and Ethics for Madhyamikas about the possibility of moral responsibility without “free will”:
I thought I’d share this because Parfit’s arguments against personal identity are often viewed as analogues to Buddhist metaphysical arguments against the Self, both of which are often taken to imply something like utilitarianism. (I used to believe something like this!)
But as the above passages highlight, anti-realism about Selves can co-exist with pragmatic fictionalism (what Madhyamaka Buddists call “conventional truth”) about Selves, and so it still makes plenty of sense to talk about “persons”, as long as we recognize that the concept of personhood (like all other concepts) are mere conventions (or so Madhyamaka Buddhists argue).
Also, regarding persuading non-consequentialists on their own terms, I’ve long been meaning to write a post (tentatively) titled “Judicious Duty: Effective Altruism for Non-Consquentialists”, so this is giving me additional motivation to eventually do so :)
Wow that’s a fascinating connection/parallel – thank you so much for sharing! Anything else you’d recommend reading in that literature? Am very curious about any other similarities between Madhyamaka Buddhism and Kantian thought
That sounds super interesting – definitely write it! If you ever want someone to read a draft or something, shoot me a dm!
Welcome! To be clear, I do think that Buddhist thought and Kantian thought are more often at odds than in alignment. It’s just that Garfield’s more careful analysis of the No-Self argument suggests that accepting the emptiness of “Self” doesn’t mean doing away with personhood-related concepts like moral responsibility.
That said, you might be interested in Dan Arnold’s Brains, Buddhas and Believing, which does try to interpret arguments from the Madhyamaka school as similar to contemporary Kantian critiques against reductionism about the mind.