I agree that the life of an EA isn’t going to be more important, even if saving that EA has greater value than saving someone who isn’t an EA.
And if we’re giving animals any moral weight at all (as we obviously should), the same can be said about people who are vegan.
Edited (after Tom A’s comment): Maybe part of the problem is we’re not clear here about what we mean by “a life”. In my mind, a life is more or less important depending on whether it contains more or less intrinsic goods. The fact that an EA might do more good than a non-EA doesn’t make their life more valuable—it doesn’t obviously add any intrinsic goods to it—it just makes saving them more valuable. On the other hand, if we mean to include all of someone’s actions and the effects of these actions in someone’s “life”, then the way it’s worded is unproblematic.
This is nit-picky, but I think it’s right. Is this what you’re getting at, Tom S?
I agree that the life of an EA isn’t going to be more important, even if saving that EA has greater value than saving someone who isn’t an EA.
And if we’re giving animals any moral weight at all (as we obviously should), the same can be said about people who are vegan.
Edited (after Tom A’s comment): Maybe part of the problem is we’re not clear here about what we mean by “a life”. In my mind, a life is more or less important depending on whether it contains more or less intrinsic goods. The fact that an EA might do more good than a non-EA doesn’t make their life more valuable—it doesn’t obviously add any intrinsic goods to it—it just makes saving them more valuable. On the other hand, if we mean to include all of someone’s actions and the effects of these actions in someone’s “life”, then the way it’s worded is unproblematic.
This is nit-picky, but I think it’s right. Is this what you’re getting at, Tom S?
1). The way it reads it sounds like you’re talking about intrinsic value to someone not used to these discussion