Thanks very much for this write-up, I learned a lot from it!
I’m a bit confused by your position on the counterfactual impact of Pugwash on political leaders’ views.
On the one hand:
You say in your summary table that there is ‘weak positive evidence’ for Claim 4, the full version of which is that “Soviet Pugwash scientists made a difference to their government’s perspective on anti-ballistic missiles.” (as an aside, I think it would be clearer to change the shorthand for Claim 4 from ‘Relaying ideas to governments’ to something that highlights the necessity for counterfactual change, e.g. ‘Counterfactually changing government position’)
You write in the section on Claim 4, “Since there is a good case that Pugwash participants had a counterfactual influence on the policy outcome, I think it is right to treat the effect of Pugwash on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as an example of a big win for Track II diplomacy.”
Your conclusion states, “This is a proof of concept indicating that Track II diplomacy can have very large effects [my emphasis] on policies that are important for great power relations.”
On the other hand:
In the section on Claim 4 you say you think it’s equally likely that “political leaders would have agreed to limit ABMs regardless of whether they were convinced that the technology could be destabilising” and that “hearing scientists’ concerns would have been important for swaying political leaders to agree to ABM limitations.”
You later write that “If Pugwash participants ultimately influenced the policy outcome in the case of anti-ballistic missiles, it was because there was a window of opportunity for influence. The advocacy of respected scientists gave leaders additional reason to support a policy which they would already have been strongly disposed to favour because of other considerations.” This suggests to me something like, “Leaders were already >50% likely to support the policy, and Pugwash increased that likelihood but did not have a decisive impact on the policy being approved.”
More generally, it might be helpful to use probability ranges to clarify what you mean by phrases like ‘a good case that’ and ‘very large effects’, and to use quantitative modelling to try to reach a more precise estimate of Pugwash’s counterfactual impact.
Thanks very much for this write-up, I learned a lot from it!
I’m a bit confused by your position on the counterfactual impact of Pugwash on political leaders’ views.
On the one hand:
You say in your summary table that there is ‘weak positive evidence’ for Claim 4, the full version of which is that “Soviet Pugwash scientists made a difference to their government’s perspective on anti-ballistic missiles.” (as an aside, I think it would be clearer to change the shorthand for Claim 4 from ‘Relaying ideas to governments’ to something that highlights the necessity for counterfactual change, e.g. ‘Counterfactually changing government position’)
You write in the section on Claim 4, “Since there is a good case that Pugwash participants had a counterfactual influence on the policy outcome, I think it is right to treat the effect of Pugwash on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as an example of a big win for Track II diplomacy.”
Your conclusion states, “This is a proof of concept indicating that Track II diplomacy can have very large effects [my emphasis] on policies that are important for great power relations.”
On the other hand:
In the section on Claim 4 you say you think it’s equally likely that “political leaders would have agreed to limit ABMs regardless of whether they were convinced that the technology could be destabilising” and that “hearing scientists’ concerns would have been important for swaying political leaders to agree to ABM limitations.”
You later write that “If Pugwash participants ultimately influenced the policy outcome in the case of anti-ballistic missiles, it was because there was a window of opportunity for influence. The advocacy of respected scientists gave leaders additional reason to support a policy which they would already have been strongly disposed to favour because of other considerations.” This suggests to me something like, “Leaders were already >50% likely to support the policy, and Pugwash increased that likelihood but did not have a decisive impact on the policy being approved.”
More generally, it might be helpful to use probability ranges to clarify what you mean by phrases like ‘a good case that’ and ‘very large effects’, and to use quantitative modelling to try to reach a more precise estimate of Pugwash’s counterfactual impact.